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                                        ABSTRACT 
 
PASSING ETHNIC IDENTITIES: 
A CASE STUDY ON COMEDY IN TURKISH CINEMA 
 
Deliormanlı, Ece 
M.A. in Department of Communication and Design 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Gürata 
 
September 2014 
 
This study analyzes minority representation strategies in Turkish cinema, 
particularly Kurds in mainstream comedies. In the study passing is taken into account 
as a representation strategy that was developed and sustained by the dominant 
ideology in order to maintain ethnic inequalities in a society. Study examines how 
minority representations are created by majority through different discourses and 
how Kurdishness contextually either exaggerated or lessened by passing strategies of 
the mainstream Turkish cinema to privilege one ethnicity, Turkishness, over the 
other(s).  
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                                                   ÖZET 
 
ETNİK KİMLİKLERİN AKTARIMI: 
TÜRK SİNEMASINDA KOMEDİ ÜZERİNE BİR DURUM 
ÇALIŞMASI 
 
                                           Deliormanlı, Ece 
                   Yüksek Lisans, İletişim ve Tasarım Bölümü 
             Danışman: Yardımcı Doçent Doktor Ahmet Gürata 
 
                                               Eylül 2014 
 
 
           Bu çalışma Türk sinemasında genel olarak azınlıkların özelde ise Kürtlerin 
ana akım komedilerdeki temsillerini analiz etmektedir. Çalışmada aktarım kavramı 
toplumdaki etnik eşitsizliği sürdürmek amacıyla baskın ideoloji tarafından 
geliştirilmiş ve sürdürülmekte olan bir temsil stratejisi olarak ele alınmıştır. Çalışma 
azınlık temsillerinin çoğunluk tarafından nasıl oluşturulduğu ve diğer azınlıklar 
karşısında Türklüğü olumlamak adına bağlamsal olarak Kürt temsillerinin ana akım 
sinemada abartılı ya da belli belirsiz olarak aktarılma stratejisini incelemektedir.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Azınlıklar, Anlatı, Kimlik, Aktarım, Kürtler, Komedi 
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                                   CHAPTER I 
 
                               INTRODUCTION 
 
 
My interest towards passing as an identity building strategy rose during one of my 
graduate courses when we discussed how a black actor seems blacker when he 
represents a drug dealer or a pimp, and how he seems whiter in a role of district 
attorney or a doctor. To that moment, to be honest, I had not paid much attention to 
color scheme of the actors as a character building strategy including light effects and 
cinematographic choices.  
As an urban, Turkish intellectual most of the time I feel like a minority in today’s 
society. I can only imagine being a lesbian Jewish woman or a transsexual Kurdish 
individual in Turkish society whose voices are less heard than mine, if not heard at 
all. As a Turk, I had been taught about racism as something which puts others at a 
disadvantage, but had not been informed about privileges of being a Turk which 
brings an advantage that I, knowingly or not, benefited through all my life. This kind 
of privilege in society inevitably affects not only individual and group life, but also 
chances and opportunities in every field including media. 
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It allowed me to think about minority representation strategies in Turkish cinema, 
particularly Kurds in mainstream comedies where they can be acknowledged as the 
blacks of Turkish society. Since “blackness” is a contextual term as Max Black 
suggests “the poor are the negroes of Europe”, or as John Lennon says, “Women are 
the niggers of the world”, and as in Gustave de Molinari’s 1880 dated observation, 
“Irish are treated by English as a kind of inferior race, as a kind of white negroes.” 
(Pieterse: 23-24), I suggest Kurds can be considered as blacks of Turkey whose 
Kurdishness contextually either exaggerated or lessened by passing strategies of the 
mainstream Turkish cinema that privileges one ethnicity, Turkishness, over the 
other(s).  
Politics of representation is still one of the core discussions of media studies where 
media hold significant power of production and dissemination of images which 
inevitably become the source of information for the masses. Media politics of the 
mainstream ideology regarding race, gender, ethnicity, and class are decisive to 
shape the understanding of a given nation. As for Turkey, for long years this 
ideology may be expressed as the ideology of the ‘white’ Turks which had derived 
from a nationalistic discourse. Using the advantage of being privileged in political 
and cultural domain, the national ideology conferred its dominance in cinema which 
lasted until very recent history.  
Turkish nation was constructed as a concrete, unified entity, an ‘imagined 
community’, although the members of the community know little of each other; they 
are obliged to feel a deep attachment as in the famous child song: “There is a village 
there, far away, that village is our village although we do not visit, although we do 
not see.” Due to assimilation policies of the Republic regarding integrating diverse 
ethnic and religious groups, Turkish cinema’s view on minority identities and 
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contribution to them through representations were shaped according to the state 
policy along with strong censorship which resulted in stereotyping and limited 
representations. Furthermore, Turkish actors and actresses passed ethnic and 
religious minorities from a privileged stance. The cinematic representation of 
minorities is inseparable from the dictates of the nation-state. Wimal Dissanayake 
(quoted in Hill & Gibson, 1998:530) states that: 
 
A nation-state should be homogenous, but when filmmakers attempt to 
articulate the experiences and lives of the minorities by thematizing the 
hardships these people go through, they create a representational space from 
where the hegemonic discourse of the state can be usefully subverted, and the 
idea of social and cultural difference emphasized.  
 
Therefore, this study deals with passing which is a representation tool that was 
developed and sustained by the dominant ideology in order to maintain ethnic and 
racial inequalities in a society with a rigid binary and hierarchal structure where 
people are either privileged or marginalized. It is a unique representation tool that 
was developed and sustained by the majority where minorities are represented by 
majority actors that allows maintaining unequal social power. Passing requires a 
rigid perception of otherness and constant imposition of otherness through 
representations.  
I chose to study passing of Kurdishness in comedy films because of two reasons: 
Kurds are the largest ethnic group in Turkey with an estimated population of 10%-
15% of the society of around 77 million people according to 2103 dated census (the 
rate is an estimation since the last census posed the question about mother tongue 
was in 1965). However, they were only passed by Turks until late 1980s without a 
name or reference to their ethnicities. Cinema audience was expected to believe the 
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passing characters as Kurds with some hints like lack of language and heavy accent, 
the geographical settings, and the dress codes. They were not presented as an ethnic 
group having cultural differences, but a group of people lack of manners, and lack of 
codes and values of their own.  
To this end, I chose to study comedies rather than other genres because comedy 
works “as a shortcut to community” (Medhurst, 2007: 21). Since comedy gratifies 
impulses which we normally repress, it becomes a very fruitful terrain to study 
ethnicity through ethnic jokes and stereotypes. Comedies allow us laughing at the 
others from a distance. After all laughing at speech, dresses, and presumed behaviors 
and lack of manner is rude, but laughing at any minority in cinema, particularly 
Kurds, is a safer ground. Moreover, when box success is considered in Turkey, 
comedy is the dominating genre. Consequently, popularity, diffuseness and the 
structure of the genre makes it an ideal terrain to study Kurdishness in comedies. 
Last but not least, although humor is widely tackled in anthropological and 
philosophical studies, despite its popularity, it is a rather neglected area in film 
studies. Andrew Horton states that comedy has long been considered as an “inferior 
genre in Western culture” and it is considerably understudied in the relevant 
literature (1991:2) to which I want to contribute.  
The practice of passing in comedies offers a productive framework to understand the 
way of seeing and representing the other. From a Freudian perspective, ethnic 
comedy is a good signifier of the subconscious of a society or the collective thinking 
of the majority. To this end, I will argue passing through Yeşilçam- cinematic era 
from the 50s to early 80s- comedy films of late 70s and early 80s which delivered 
moments of pleasure, mostly to urban middle class, through certain stereotypes that 
are product of a dominant discourse where ethnic passing underlined the differences, 
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instead of providing solution to social prejudices. Yeşilçam comedies will be 
analyzed in the light of superiority and relief theories of humor which concentrates 
on repressed hostile feelings and implicit ethnic superiority. Contemporary films will 
be examined to reveal the changes of passing and the narrative towards Kurds. Latter 
films, written and directed by Kurdish origin mainstream director/actor/writer 
Yılmaz Erdoğan, will reveal special cultural codes of an ethnic minority, which was 
not presented previously, and his orchestration of speech, make-up, costume, décor 
and music along with acting breaks the positional superiority of the former 
narratives. However, I will suggest that his passing strategy doesn’t differ from the 
previous one in terms of affirmation of Turkishness and it is in line with the 
unchanged subconscious of the society.  
While discussing the issue, I will not concentrate on the accuracy or the reality of the 
representations; rather I will take the path of Mikhael Bakhtin who suggests that 
human consciousness and artistic practice do not get into contact with the real 
directly, but rather ideology. Since artistic language is the object of representation, it 
is not the reflection of the real world; therefore an artistic discourse is a reflection of 
a reflection which is a mediation of an already textualized and discursivized socio-
ideological world (Stam, 1991: 252). The discourses that art represents are social and 
historical therefore are destined to change in time. I will take into account these 
social changes while discussing passing in films and draw attention to connection 
between representation, discourse and power.  
The theoretical framework for this study is articulated within the field of discourse 
analysis that examines the structures and functions of the textual and visual 
components in their social, political and cultural contexts. This approach claims that 
in order to understand the role of cinema and its messages, detailed attention should 
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be paid to the structures and strategies of such discourses and their relation to 
institutional arrangement. Therefore a brief conceptual analysis is required to see 
kinds of power relations that are involved in cinematic production. I will concentrate 
on the concepts of power/knowledge and ideology to understand the conventions of 
ethnic passing in comedy films.  
Thus, the aim of the paper is to reveal how minority representations worked for the 
construction of un-Turkishness, how Turkish mainstream namely Yeşilçam ‘passed’ 
minorities in Turkish comedies, specifically Kurds in comedies set in East Anatolia 
from 1978 to 1981, and how this passing has changed on surface, but not in heart, in 
contemporary comedy films of 2000s.  
The seven analyzed films have common features of being set in Eastern province, 
villages and a small town, where underdevelopment is underlined with Kurdish rural 
life. To this extend, I will examine Salako/Stupid(o) (Atıf Yılmaz, 1974), Kibar 
Feyzo/Polite Feyzo (Atıf Yılmaz, 1978), Erkek Güzeli Sefil Bilo/Man Beauty 
Miserable Bilo (Ertem Eğilmez, 1979), Şark Bülbülü/Mockingbird of the East (Kartal 
Tibet, 1979), and Davaro (Kartal Tibet, 1981) as Yeşilçam comedies which pass 
Kurdishness as the opposite of Turkishness with a privileged and hegemonic point of 
view by orientalizing the ethnic people through depicting them as uncivilized, 
childish, ignorant, lazy, and lack of Turkish urban manners. Same era films Banker 
Bilo (Ertem Eğilmez, 1980), can be considered a sequel to Erkek Güzeli Sefil 
Bilo/Man Beauty Miserable Bilo, Şalvar Davası/Shalwar Case (Kartal Tibet, 1983) 
and Züğürt Ağa/Broke Ağa (Nesli Çölgeçen, 1985) are not involved in this study 
since the first is an urban comedy set in İstanbul, the second is a rural comedy set in 
Western Anatolia and not passing Kurdishness, and the last is not a comedy but a 
drama.  
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Yeşilçam comedies will be followed by the analysis of two contemporary province 
films Vizontele/Visiontele (Ömer Faruk Sorak & Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2001) and 
Vizontele Tuuba/Visiontele Tuuba (Yılmaz Erdoğan, 2004) which depict Kurds ‘less 
Kurds’, but ‘more Turks’, a passing strategy requires assimilated Kurds to be 
welcomed by the audience. My claim is that depending on the cinematic era 
mainstream cinema passes Kurds as ‘more or less Kurds’, in a strategy which aims to 
maintain dominance of Turkishness over the others of the society through underlying 
the presumed differences or lack of them.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
PASSING 
 
 
In recent years the theme of passing has overspread and has become a source of 
productive debate terrain within certain disciplines, including literary theory, 
philosophy, cultural studies, gender studies, race and ethnic studies. This is to say, 
the representation of passing facilitates critical discourses about essentialist 
categories such as race, gender and sexuality. The concern of this study is the 
relation of passing between ethnicity and cultural representation. Therefore, firstly I 
will define passing in sociologic terms, as a process of rejection, imposition, 
adaptation and perception, then I will draw attention to forms of passing and its 
requirements, finally since passing is a matter of taking appearance for reality I will 
discuss passing in terms of cinematic representation from tragic interpretations, 
relying on the conventional understanding of the term, to more contemporary 
understandings that involve comic ethnic stereotypes and performances.  
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2.1. Passing as a Social Phenomenon 
As a social phenomenon, in simple terms, passing is an essentialist notion that 
indicates acting against one’s true subjectivity. Although the notion is contested, 
traditionally it means negation of subjectivity and denial of one’s racial self. Racial 
and ethnic passing requires a society that has a majority and minorities. And, “due to 
cruel social, political, cultural and historical realities of the system of racial 
oppression characteristic of American society, passing assumed a peculiar role 
relative to African-American context” (Hostert-Camaiti, 2007:10) where deception is 
performed secretly by light colored blacks to promote in social life. “The 
commonsense understanding of the notion contains deception and self denial in a 
society with a rigid binary and hierarchal structure [where] there are two classes of 
people: privileged and marginalized,” Camaiti adds (ibid: 11).  
Traditional approach considers this self negation and denial of racial self carries 
negative implications. “On this view passing is the intentional presenting oneself to 
the world in a manner that conflicts how the individual views herself or himself” 
(ibid: 12). Confliction derives from violating the laws of identity and sameness, from 
disengagement of true identity. At the end, the core of the person is violated or 
buried forever. These theories “tend to position passing as a radical and transgressive 
practice that serves to destabilize and traverse the system of knowledge and vision 
upon which subjectivity and identity precariously rests” (Ahmed, 1999: 88). From 
this stance, racial passers are trespassers of the society who cause rupture and 
breakage from the social norms which stabilize and secure social identities.  
Considering the social realm of the 19
th
 century in the USA, instead of negating the 
term, we may call passing as a survival tool and a ticket to freedom. The term has 
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gained positive meaning in time by some scholars such as Kathleen Pfeiffer who says 
“passing should be seen as a part of American individualism, the tradition in which 
individuals make and remake themselves” (Hostert-Camaiti, 2007:13). She suggests 
that passing is about self-making, expressing human agency and subjectivity. 
Similarly Werner Sollos chose not to see the phenomenon through a “narrow frame 
of racial hatred” where passing becomes a “structural conflict between identity as 
achieved and ascribed” (ibid: 14).  
Then, the notion becomes a performative one not necessarily relies on self or racial 
hatred, but it is more about to build one’s self according to whatever design is 
chosen. Gayle Wald contributes to the discussion by stating that narratives of passing 
pose an ethical and political challenge to the contemporary readers and asks them to 
“consider their own political, theoretical, or ideological interests in race as a site of 
identification and political or cultural investment, its fictional qualities 
notwithstanding” (Wald, 2007: 9). Thus passing becomes a useful tool to question 
issues of identity and meta-narratives that most of us are privileged to choose to 
ignore. And, passing, finally, forces us to think what makes people ‘other’ and why 
we should care. Since the term is strictly in relation with social hierarchy, it is easily 
adoptable to Turkish society where Turkishness is privileged and the others are 
marginalized starting from the beginning of the nation state. Most of the times, 
passing had been used as a tool of transgressing the rigid boundaries of Turkish 
society to be accepted. Acclaimed director Yılmaz Güney stated in one his interviews 
that: 
Many Kurds held prominent positions in society and reached the highest 
ranks of the state apparatus, but this was because they never said ‘I am a 
Kurd’. ‘The Kurdish deputies in the parliamentary are elected as Turks living 
in a country that denies the existence of Kurdish population” (in Dönmez-
Colin, 2008: 117).  
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 2.2. Passing as Performance 
The concept has been widened in years containing not only race but gender, religion 
and class as well. Through the years real life experiences indicate that many people 
chose to pass another identity for many reasons from social acceptance to 
professional achievements. New interpretations of passing pass beyond the context of 
race, and as Elaine Ginsberg poses, passing has become a tool to challenge 
essentialism and it focuses on construction of identity. Using the real life experiences 
of a slave called Edmund Kenney who passed as white in 1836 and Teena Brandon 
who passed as a man, called himself Brandon Teena, in 1993, Nebraska whose life 
story was told in Boys Don’t Cry (Kimberly Pierce, 1999), where he was 
impersonalized by Hillary Swank who won an Academy Award for her performance, 
Ginsberg suggests that identities are structured beyond the modalities of truth or 
false. While evaluating their stories she states that their actions may be called 
“performative, neither constituted by nor indicating the existence of a “true self” or 
core identity” […] the stories illustrate, “passing is about identities: their creation or 
imposition, their adaptation and rejection, their accompanying rewards or penalties” 
(Ginsberg, 1996: 2). In Kenney’s case he was rewarded by freedom, but in 
Brandon’s case he was brutally murdered when his physical gender was revealed.  
In the postmodern context, passing negates a true core or identity, instead “the 
process and discourse of passing challenges essentialism that is often the foundation 
of identity politics, a challenge that may be seen as either threatening or liberating 
but in either instance discloses the truth that identities are not singularly true or false 
but multiple and contingent” (Ginsberg, 1996: 4). Similarly Samira Kawash states 
“there is no authentic, original identity that could be hidden or imitated; there are 
copies and copies of copies that give the impression of originality” (in Hostert-
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Camaiti, 2007: 16). Shortly passing becomes a tool for liberation from the rigid rules 
of the society and from the stereotypes which redesigns the boundaries of categories 
and the symbolic universe. 
In some cases passing may be temporary, brief and situational and the reason of 
passing is motivated by other reasons such as exposes of racism. As remembered, 
German journalist Walraff had passed for a Turkish immigrant worker (Gastarbeiter) 
for two years from 1983 under the name of Ali Levent Sinirlioğlu, and worked in 
various places from McDonalds to Thyssen. Furthermore, he placed himself among 
the people who were tested for medicine. He collected his bitter memories of being a 
minority in Germany in his 1985 dated highly acclaimed book Ganz Unten/The 
Lowest of the Low where he documented ill behavior immigrants had faced, and the 
mistreatment he received at the hands of employers, landlords and the German 
government.  
Similarly, white American journalist John Howard Griffin’s 1961 dated ethno-
journalistic study Black Like Me presents his experiment in race passing in the South 
states during the late 1959 to reveal black oppression and white privilege. As a 
Texan, he medically and cosmetically altered his skin color to pass as a black man in 
some of the most segregated and impoverished regions of the South. His experiences 
vary from being turned away from hotels and restaurants and being target of racial 
animosity to being denied from banking privileges gained him a “white cross-racial 
of understanding” that would be impossible to gain through orthodox methods 
(Ginsberg, 1996:151-152). These two journalists reveal the importance of passing in 
communication and in understanding the isolated groups. Thus passing has become a 
political tool through which we think about the meanings of classical notions of 
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identity, like Turk, minority or non-Muslim, and why we should care these identities 
after all.  
As described the term contains myriad kinds of passing driven by different aims and 
reasons, from avoiding social conflict or rejection, or to fulfill personal and 
professional aspirations one can pass full time, part time or only on occasion as 
described in the experiences of the journalists. In most cases passing is about people 
who pass to be more truly themselves, and at the very least they make us to assess 
the validity of context regarding social issues from ethnicity to class and gender.  
 
2.3. How Do We Pass? 
In order to pass and “to be” one has to act, behave, talk, and, shortly, live in order to 
convince others who they really want to be or acknowledged to be. Not in all cases 
passing is a liberating experience, for instance in the 16
th
 century Ottoman Empire, 
where high taxes had levied on non-Muslims, Christians were passing as Muslim in 
public life. Since they pass as Sunni Muslim, these people called as Crypto Christian 
who could had declared themselves as Christians in the 19
th
 century (Yaşartürk, 
2012: 80-81)  To pass, one may have to change her/his, talking, walking, clothing, 
body language, gestures, hair color, and some other physical attributes in addition to 
change of the life style. Then, in order to pass some labels about the adapted identity 
come into recognition. The ability to pass involves a technique of the self that is to 
project the bodily image through alterations of various signifiers. Then when a black 
passes as white what are the elements for convincing others that he or she is as white 
as milk? Or a Jew passing for gentile, Kurd passing for Turk, what standards of 
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morality, codes and values are praised? How do we read as we look at others’ bodies 
and classify them for their class, gender or ethnicity? 
Passing requires both eliminating, rejecting certain aspects of given life or identity, 
or denial of background and ancestry, in most cases secrecy, and in return adopting 
and executing new aspects attributed to the selves other than the given one. Since the 
scope of this study is passing as ethnic minorities in comedies, I will limit the 
discussion with ethnical aspects of passing. Therefore, I will clarify the term of 
ethnicity, and secondly discuss the aspects of ethnic-labeling which makes passing 
possible.  
“Ethnic identity has traditionally meant the associations with the more stable 
elements of one’s heritage (traditions, people-hood, orientation to the past, religion, 
language, ancestry, values, economics and aesthetics) and culture (social 
organization)” (Bernal& Knight, 1993; Gans, 1979 in Nakayama &Martin, 1999: 
29). Ethnicity was discussed by scholars from different disciplines from sociology to 
anthropology and one of the oldest definitions is from sociologist Milton Gordon 
who named the conditions for an ethnic group that are race, religion and national 
origin which together create a people-hood relying on cultural pluralism. R. A. 
Shermerhorn added a component to ethnic identity that is “memories of a shared 
past”. Anthropologists Raoul Naroll and Ronald Reminick drew attention to the 
parameters of being an ethnic group such as territorial contiguity, language, local 
community structure, levels of operation. David Schneider underlined the importance 
of “small group of epitomizing symbols. Among the most influential anthropologists 
in the field, Frederik Barth emphasizes the importance of self-ascription; the factors 
that are recognized significant by the subjects. He shifts emphasis from internal 
factors like race and religion to individual’s choice. Then the core of the ethnic group 
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is the codes and values which are divided into two: overt signals of food, dress, and 
language, and basic value orientations of standards of morality and excellence 
(Friedman, 1991: 14-15).  
Among the brief sociological and anthropological definitions of ethnicity, the ones 
that favor the predetermined conditions like blood and nature, and the ones on self-
determination and personal taste which may be read as self ascription, I will take into 
consideration the both views without compromising opposite theories rely both on, 
“descent and consent” as Werner Sollos states (ibid: 19). In addition to decent and 
consent of the group, ethnicity also is defined by containing the others’ perception 
that brings “labeling and identification” (Hall, 1992) (Nakayama &Martin, 1999: 29). 
In the context of this study labeling becomes crucial; how Turks label themselves 
and as well as the others? To what extend dominant discourse acknowledge the 
above mentioned codes and values? To give an example, there are two significant 
Kurdish words used in Turkish slang to insult to subject in terms of manners: hırbo 
and kıro. These words had entered in Turkish language through 70s and 80s when 
urban immigration of the Kurds significantly increased. Hırbo originally means the 
Kurdish character in tradition theatre ortaoyunu, and kıro literally means young boy 
in Kurdish. However, these words have lost their original meaning and become 
labeling tools in daily life with wide spread usage referring to uncivilized manners, 
boorishness and being hick, respectively. And sometimes, as Yılmaz Güney noted, 
even “being called as Kurd is an insult” (Dönmez-Colin, 2008: 117). Similarly there 
are other degrading terms regarding other minorities in Turkey such as ‘Armenian 
seed’ and ‘Greek bastard’. Thus, ethnic labeling is a strong part of hate speech in 
Turkey.  
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Inevitably any kind of identity is defined and experienced through socially 
constructed expressions which are based on social hierarchy of judgment. Classical 
sayings of Atatürk, founder of the Republic, are good examples of positive self 
labeling: ‘Turkish nation is smart, Turkish nation is hard working’ and ‘how happy 
the one who says I am Turk’. Since the aim of the new Republic was a rationalist 
progress, it was an understandable and, to some extent, useful statement, but it is a 
reasonable question to ask: if Turkish nation is smart and hard working, what are the 
others who do not consider themselves as Turks? The complex position of the state 
towards pre-existing ethnicities reveals itself in such discourses. This saying proves 
the construction and dynamic nature of labeling happens in certain discourses and is 
subject to change in time. Similarly, African-Americans were labeled as black by the 
white majority, but in the last decades with “self-determination and control over their 
identity”, the black community has changed their labeling with drawing attention to 
the ancestry over their color (Nakayama &Martin, 1999: 31).  
Since films are coproduction of time, place, culture, authorship, desire, spectator 
mediation, and acting among other factors and forces (Foster, 2003: 3), by no means 
cinema attempts to capture reality; instead it captures distorted hegemonies of kinds 
that are nothing but fiction. An important part of this fiction is acting, a deliberate 
fabrication which aims to substitute illusion for reality. Therefore a brief history of 
passing in cinema in general, comedies in particular, will be discussed to see how the 
notion of sociological passing was used by cinema, then how the term has evolved in 
time from racist and tragic interpretations to comic performances. 
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2.4. Passing in Cinema 
The traditional sense of act of passing that is to pass as white was reversed in early 
days of cinema due to racial prejudice where black characters were routinely played 
by whites in blackface wearing black face make-up, in order to mimic and appear as 
a black person. Back then, it was the only way to see an act of pseudo-black 
performance. In the first film of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1903) all of the major black 
roles were whites in blackface. This tradition continued in films like The Nigger 
(Edgar Lewis, 1915) and The Birth of a Nation (D.W. Griffith, 1915) where Griffith 
casted whites in blackface to represent all of its major black characters, but reaction 
against the film's racism largely put an end to this practice in dramatic films. 
Thereafter, whites in blackface would appear almost exclusively in broad comedies 
in the context of a vaudeville or minstrel performance within a film such as in Jazz 
Singer (Alan Crosland, 1927), Swing Time (George Stevens, 1936), and Everybody 
Sing (Edwin L. Marin, 1938). Black makeup was largely eliminated from cinema in 
the U.S. after the end of the 30s, when public sensibilities regarding race began to 
change where blackface became increasingly associated with racism and bigotry. 
Although blackface was erased from cinema, made-up whites routinely played 
Native Americans, Asians, Arabs, and so forth, for several more decades 
(Strausbaugh, 2006: 203-215).  
The act of blackface was parodied in Tropic Thunder (Ben Stiller, 2008) where 
Robert Downey Jr. plays a Caucasian Australian actor who is so committed to 
method acting an African-American character that he has his skin surgically 
darkened. “I’m a dude playin’ a dude disguised as another dude,” he drawls. His role 
is a parody of hardcore method actors though parody of blackface. Similarly, Spike 
Lee addresses blackface in his comedy Bamboozled (2000) where he tells a story of a 
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black television executive who wants to get fired and to this end hires two black 
street performers who perform blackface on a TV show which becomes a huge 
success. Both films humorously dramatize and criticize racism through passing and 
display how blackness is symbolized through an array of seemingly embodied signs 
from black skin, full lips to black way of walking and jive talking. These 
performances are mocking essentialist identity creation through allegedly racial 
norms.  
After the WWII the narrative frames of the films had changed along with the social 
changes. War time contributions of black soldiers rose awareness towards racial 
segregation. While discussing the narrative changes, Gayle Ward states that although 
new films about passing seem to put forward liberal narratives regarding questions of 
racial integration, the films such as Pinky (Elia Kazan, 1949) and Lost Boundaries 
(Alfred G. Werker, 1949) depict minority experiences for majority audience and 
“establish passing as the justification, in retrospect, for disciplining of the racially 
defined subject in the name of national interests.” Ward also underlines that in the 
both films white actors pass as black who are passing white which is a “conventional 
practice underscoring the industry’s reluctance to integrate with black labor force” 
(Ward, 2000: 21). White passing blacks in mainstream cinema derives from financial 
and social reasons such as easy promotion and marketing, the impossibility of 
interracial romance, to draw white audience (ibid: 91), a very similar pattern of 
Yeşilçam in which minorities were passed by Turks where the majority of the 
audience was Muslim-Turks.  
Above mentioned films tell stories of light colored black people who pass for white 
through their lives and face a defining moment in their lives where a conflict occurs 
between their race, national identity and class. Both films underscore the possibility 
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of American dream when worked hard “while also insisting that they (protagonists) 
remain in their places, racially speaking” (Ward, 2000: 87). A contemporary film 
about white passing Human Stain (Robert Benton, 2003) adopted from the same 
name novel of Philip Roth, Sir Anthony Hopkins plays a distinguished professor 
although being black who passed as Jewish American. His character Coleman Silk is 
accused of racism when he calls two absent students from class as spooks without 
even knowing that they were black. He has two choices; to come clean and reveal his 
secret that he is black or resign where he chooses the latter. Ironically he dies in the 
hands of an anti-Semite where he becomes a tragic figure. Eventually, passing 
becomes, if not altogether bad, to some extent a really bad idea, and society, or life 
itself, will punish the passer for breaking the rules (Kroeger, 2004: 2). Consequently, 
mentioned cinematic representations through passing in mainstream cinema shape 
public discourse about race, and unfortunately not in a liberal or in a progressive 
manner. The films are like Greek tragedy if not didactic, eager to render retribution 
to those who exceeder and overstep presumed natural boundaries.  
Passing of other ethnicities are also questionable if not problematic. American 
mainstream cinema routinely turns to non-Asian actors to portray Asian characters in 
films. In the history of Hollywood many known actors and actresses, such as 
Katharine Hepburn, Fred Astaire, Ingrid Bergman, Yul Brynner, and John Wayne, 
took roles that required them to "slant" their eyes, do the funny walk attributed as 
Oriental, and practice poor Oriental accents. These yellow-face performances by 
Caucasians both reinforce and embody labeling reveal itself in negative stereotypes 
consisting of funny accent, buck teeth, glasses, and sometimes prosthetic eyelids and 
taping eyes back into a slant. This practice gives us the perception of Asianness in 
Western culture where Asian people are degraded to a few elements all about 
20 
 
appearance. German-born Luise Rainer won an Academy Award for passing a 
Chinese peasant in The Good Earth (Sidney Franklin, 1937) with a bad make-up 
without even attempting for a Chinese accent. Directed by Tom Tykwer and Lana 
and Andy Wachowski, The Cloud Atlas (2012) is one of the most epic displays of 
yellow-face where audience exposed to images of non-Asian actors wearing slanty 
eyes instead of using Asian actors. One of the stories is set in Neo Seoul in the year 
2144, where Jim Sturgess and Keith David wear makeup and eye-enhancements to 
appear ethnically Asian. With a little adjustment to eyes, the film offers being 
Korean requires nothing but slanty eyes. Yellow-face logic, as in black and brown-
face and any other faces, supports and maintains an unequal power relation between 
the majority and the minority where imaginary and derogatory representations are 
executed by white actors while minority actors are excluded from acting such roles. 
As a practice of cultural appropriation, yellow-face recreates what is thought to be 
Asian and gives clue about the collective thinking of the majority. Therefore, “the 
production and distribution of imaginary Orientalist externalizations of Asianness 
helps reinforce the mainstream dominant control of cultural performance generally” 
(Ono& Pham, 2009: 45-46). This tendency is also relevant to Yeşilçam which 
controlled the ethnic representations in a tight sphere where non-Muslim minorities 
were passed by Turkish actors/actresses with highly exaggerated manners through 
imaginary and derogatory representations.  
When it comes to comedies passing gains a different meaning; ridiculing other races, 
ethnicities or minorities through stereotypes. Here we see how the otherness is 
perceived in a given society. In Blake Edwards’ Breakfast in Tiffany’s (1961), 
Mickey Rooney passes as a Japanese character Mr. Yunioshi who is a caricature who 
has fake teeth far too big for his mouth and wears bandanna all the time referring to 
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classical Far East martial arts. His heavily made-up, bucktoothed, myopic Japanese 
passing is broadly exotic. In another Edwards’ comedy The Party (1968), Peter 
Sellers passes as an Indian actor called Hrundi V. Bakshi who accidentally gets 
invited to a posh Hollywood dinner party and makes terrible mistakes based upon 
ignorance of Western manners. Sellers’ brown-face routine depending on fish out of 
water premise can be acknowledged as offensive and stereotypical. The same pattern 
is seen in The Love Guru (Marco Schnabel, 2008) which explicitly mocks Hindu 
culture and writer and actor Mike Myers’ performance of what an Indian man looks 
and acts like is obnoxious.  
In Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of 
Kazakhstan (Larry Charles, 2006), audience laughs, most probably not Kazakh 
audience, at a Hebrew-speaking British Jew pretending to be a Russian-speaking 
Kazakh hick. In The Dictator (Larry Charles, 2012) Cohen’s authoritarian ruler of 
the fictional Republic of Wadiya is a hairy and highly misogynistic Arab. With a 
tanned skin, beard, funny accent and funnier eccentric costumes Cohen passes this 
character with spreading anti-Semitic polemics and funny jokes about killing people 
which is beyond stereotyping. All passing attempts indicate lack of originality; 
instead they expose the audience to essentialist representations decorated with 
embodied ethnical references in order to underline differences.  
Consequently any form of racial and ethnic passing systematically manufactures a 
way to maintain dominance over others’ and/or minorities’ subordination which is 
one of the main concerns of this study. Throughout Yeşilçam not only minorities 
were harshly marginalized but Turkishness was affirmed through certain stereotypes. 
In time the discourses regarding minorities have changed, but still historical 
stereotypes linger in mainstream cinema. Sarah Ahmed argues that passing requires a 
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“knowable other who can be fetishized” (Ahmed, 1999: 98), which enables 
inhabiting the place of the other through adapting or taking on signifiers of the other. 
In mainstream Turkish cinema “passing becomes a mechanism reconstituting or 
reproducing the other as the ‘not-I’, beyond the structure of the ‘I’ (Ahmed, 1999: 
100) that implicitly underline the features of the ‘I’ with a successful technique of 
transformation through the supposed knowledge of the other. Therefore, passing 
becomes an affirmation of the self through acting like the other. Then, in mainstream 
cinema passing becomes a tool to affirm the privileged identity through 
differentiation form the other.  
On the other hand passing in cinema can happen quite differently; requires none of 
the above mentioned techniques but uses class as reference. Television success The 
Cosby Show (1984-1992), through an apolitical narrative, deports fundamental 
cultural heritage of black people through depicting American dream which bleaches 
the black family. The dominant audience had welcomed the Huxtable family due to 
their white manners and middle-class ethics. Similarly Sidney Poitier, the first black 
star of Hollywood, met white standards through his “against the grain” manners. 
Donald Bogle describes his characters as tame, coherent with the system sans 
impulsive acts, sterile and almost sexless; a liberal dream, a man who can be invited 
to dinner by whites (Hall, 1997a: 253). Poitier was acknowledged by white audience 
like one of them due to his perfect manners that are believed to be particular to 
whites. This passing strategy creates “less black” people who are in tune with the 
rules and demands of society. This strategy will manifest itself in contemporary 
comedies of this study which pass Kurds as ‘more Turks’ and ‘less Kurds’, another 
strategy to maintain dominance and soundness of Turkishness. At the end both 
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strategies, over emphasizing or ignoring cultural differences, help to support and 
maintain unequal power relations in mainstream media. 
In Turkey passing is a complex issue both socially and cinematically. As mentioned 
how Kurds passed as Turks to be accepted by the society, also minority 
actors/actresses of Yeşilçam passed as Turks in their real life (except Toto Karaca 
and Nubar Terziyan). Many known Yeşilçam Armenian stars like Kenan Pars, Sami 
Hazinses, Turgut Özatay, Adile and Selim Naşit and Vahi Öz passed as Turks to be 
welcomed by the audience and the sector (Balcı, 2013: 56) which is a sign of the 
strict hierarchical social structure of the society.  
On the other hand, in cinema, Turkish actors/actresses passed as minorities. Until 70s 
only non-Muslim minorities-Rums, Armenians and Jews- were explicitly depicted in 
films where Turkish actors/actresses passed as Rums as Oya Peri in Ağlayan 
Melek/Crying Angel (Safa Önal, 1970) who lives out of wedlock with an elderly 
man, Mürüvvet Sim in Söz Müdafanın/The Word is Plea’s (Mehmet Dinler, 1970) 
who runs a brothel and drugs young women to blackmail, and Bahar Erdeniz in Arap 
Abdo/Arabic Abdo (Remzi Jöntürk, 1974) who is a singer and an unreliable mistress 
to protagonist Abdo. Similarly Turks passed Armenians as Mürüvvet Sim in Siyah 
Gelinlik/Black Wedding Gown (Orhan Elmas, 1973), Sabahsız Geceler/ Nights 
without Morning (Ertem Görenç, 1968), Kara Gözlüm/My Dark Eyed One (Yılmaz, 
1970), and Nevzat Okçugil in Bekar Odası/ Bachelor Room (Türker İnanoğlu, 1967) 
with heavy accent and eccentric manners. In Bizim Kız/Our Girl (Türker İnanoğlu, 
1970) Zeki Alpan passes for Armenian jeweler Vartanyan and Kayhan Yıldızoğlu 
passes for Jewish jeweler David who is depicted stingy and very competitive. In Üç 
Arkadaş/Three Friends (Memduh Ün, 1971) Reşit Çildam passes for Jewish stingy 
pawnbroker, and in Karakolda Ayna Var/There is Mirror in Police Station (Halit 
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Refiğ, 1966) Orhan Çoban passes for a Jew called “cribber” Moiz, a ruthless but a 
coward man. A few examples reveal that there are certain categories established in 
passing minorities. These categories were created depending on prejudice, supposed 
knowledge of others, and essentialist labeling which makes strict distinction between 
the majority and the rest. This kind of passing relies on the notion of a core identity 
that is to be preserved and underlined in order to emphasize their differences from 
the majority. These categories will be discussed in further parts where minority 
representations and stereotyping will be touched upon.  
Although Kurdish stories were told starting from the 50s without mentioning 
Kurdishness, it was the 70s when Kurdish actors, as Kurds, stepped into the scene 
such as Yılmaz Güney. It is an advantage that no makeup was required in Turkish 
cinema since all ethnicities are from the same geography and share same physical 
attributions. Their resemblance in physical figure was diminished by the exaggerated 
or blended manners.  
The following chapter will touch upon how minorities were stereotyped in favor of 
construction of a positive national identity through passing and its strategies in 
Yeşilçam as a means of criticizing modernism and Western values that are attributed 
to minorities. In this manner, passing in Yeşilçam had an additional purpose other 
than ridiculing or resenting the minorities; to construct a new nationalistic Turkish 
identity.  
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CHAPTER III 
  
  NARRATIVE AND IDENTITY 
 
 
While discussing passing I drew attention to the importance of labeling which is 
never natural but discursive, and derives from the power relations between the 
dominant and marginalized groups. Labeling is tenacious, and deeply embedded in 
society’s structure of thinking. Thus this chapter will focus on how Turks label 
themselves and the others of the society. Minorities hold significance to understand 
the logic of passing in a given society and its social structure. Since passing occurs in 
a society having a hierarchical structure among ethnicities where one is favored over 
the others, firstly Turkish identity construction in relation of the minorities will be 
examined in a newly founded nationalistic Republic and then the transformation of 
the nationalistic discourse. As Hall (1996: 4) suggests: 
 
Identities are constructed within discourse; we need to understand them as 
produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive 
formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they 
emerge within the specific modalities of power, thus are more product of the 
making of difference and exclusion. 
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And since identities are discursive and constructed through representations which 
linger in the collective memory of the societies and become living entities, the 
relations of narrative, memory and identity will be touched upon. On the one hand 
Turkishness, on the other all denied identities, this chapter will focus on the minority 
representations and stereotyping as a tool which “reduces, essentializes, naturalizes 
and fixes the difference” (Hall, 1997a: 258) in Turkish cinema in relation to 
dominant discourse of the society.  
 
3.1. Understanding the Social Structure 
3.1.1. Imagining the Turkish Nation  
Throughout the 20
th
 century, the concept of modernity was acknowledged as a 
fundamental and universal truth, which all societies would have to adopt themselves 
to. Accordingly Turkish modernization process had transformed state traditions 
fundamentally through rapid urban transformation, mentality shift, and change in 
cultural production that all eventually had transformed everyday life. Savaş Arslan 
notes that (2001: 66) binary oppositions of Turkish experience of modernity and 
modernization are not different from other nation-state experiences: “Western-non 
western, Turks and non Turks, secular state and religious masses, center and 
periphery, urban and rural, wealthy and improvised”. However, as Nilüfer Göle 
states Turkish modernization history can be considered the most radical cultural shift 
that executed voluntarily. This process “went far beyond the modernizing the state 
apparatus as the country changed from a multiethnic Ottoman empire to secular 
republican nation state; [it] attempted to penetrate into the lifestyles, manners, 
behavior and daily customs of the people” (1997: 83).  
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Keeping in mind the dominant ideology of the time was nationalism, cinema was one 
of the significant tools in disseminating these manners and behaviors to newly 
constructed nation. Within the production of the nation as an imagined community, 
the roles and stereotypes attributed to minorities played a potent role in nationalist 
identity creation. To this end, hybridity is oppressed for the sake of creating a 
monolithic nation state.  
Constitutive role of discourse, as ways of constituting knowledge as Michel Foucault 
states, in identity building is evident in Turkish example. Thus, Turkish subjectivity 
can be elaborated as both outcome, for the modernized, and the very source, for the 
modernizers, of knowledge and power in Foucauldian terms. As a discourse, Turkish 
identity and Turkishness was produced by the narrations that are carried by different 
institutions from schools, media to military. If we hold a mirror to the terms now and 
then, we see these discourses are not closed systems and have changed in time 
significantly due to changing social power. Being one of the potent institutions, 
cinema has particular power to contribute to any discourse in any given period.  
As Stuart Hall states, the national identities are inevitable constructions; “we are born 
with, but are formed and transformed within and in relation to representation” (2001: 
292). Accordingly, to be Turkish can only be understood because of the way 
Turkishness is represented with meanings, values and culture. The historical outcome 
of the collapsed Ottoman Empire and the end of the ümmet (Islamic religious 
community) notion, Turkishness is a modern form where ethnic differences are 
subsumed beneath a national identity which is formed in relation to significant 
others. This articulation manifests itself also in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities where he suggests that (2006: 6-7) nationhood may be understood as an 
“imagined community”, since the members of a nation can never really get to know 
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or meet their fellow members and regardless of the differences, inequality and 
injustices that exists in a society, the notion of nation is perceived in the imagination 
as one of equality and unity. His work underscores the symbolic and emotional 
power of nationalism at both individual and collective levels and helps to explain the 
cultural-cognitive process that draws the line between groups and emphasizes the 
role of media in consolidation of nationalism especially in terms of mass production 
and distribution of images. With production and reproduction of certain images, 
communities gain collective memories which linger through decades.  
As a symbolic community, nation requires membership or participation and is linked 
to the idea of unity through acts like singing national anthem, celebrating special 
days and attending ceremonies to constitute a sense of identity through institutions 
and representations. As a discourse, the national culture and identity are needed to be 
told constantly, for this objective they require certain narrations. Hall suggests that 
narrative of nations are told and retold in national histories, literatures, the media, 
and popular culture which provide sets of images and stories focusing on origins, 
continuity, timelessness and traditions of original, pure people (2001: 293-295) 
which was also the case in the birth of Turkishness. To this end, mass media creates 
a common information space where collective group consciousness enables to 
transcend geographical space to achieve national identity. 
The narrative elements of the Turkish nation were created by the revolution made in 
1923. The new Republic united varied identities under an umbrella to create a nation 
state. It used culture as an integration tool, and imposed common ways of thinking, 
understanding and vision to a mixed community. Turkish modernization is 
characterized as a process, as Savaş Arslan states, “Turkification-from-above” by 
political elites. This process aimed to create a national core and nationalization of 
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Anatolia which was associated with a series of reforms in relation to modernization 
and westernization. Arslan underscores that “Kemalism relied on a metaphor of light: 
the republican officials, teachers, and soldiers bringing enlightment to the farthest 
parts of Anatolia, where traditional and backward forces of religion, feudal economic 
and social systems and rural life persisted” (2011: 63). However, the project of 
nationalism conducted oppression upon its internal others and clearly aimed urban 
and educated citizens while ignoring the ethnically and religiously diverse and rural 
population (ibid: 44-48).  
During the nationalization of culture state played a dominant role in cultural sphere 
where reforms enabled the state to regulate the behavior of its citizens through their 
everyday life activities from choice of music, the language they spoke, the clothes 
they wore to the leisure activities and family relations (Çınar, 2008: 15). However, 
modernization did not originate as an historical outcome through internal dynamics 
of civil society. Çağlar Keyder underlines the crucial feature of this kind of 
modernization is that modernizers wield state power in their interests. They are not 
necessarily committed to modernity as a whole, but choose some dimensions and this 
process eventually tends to crisis and undermines the ultimate goals of modernity 
(1997:39). With these arbitrary choices from political to cultural, dictated Turkish 
modernism had shaped the national identity and national characteristics suppressing 
cultural differences, not to mention the ignorance of social classes. Consequently, 
imposition of the Republic’s elites’ modernity notion, their positivist modification of 
daily life and cultural practices, and the secular policies alienated the minorities, 
rural and traditional parts of the country. This kind of modern formation of cultural 
identity focuses upon the establishment of as Ernest Gellner calls “high culture” 
which is defined as: 
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Generalized diffusion of school mediated, academy supervised idiom, 
codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and 
technological communication. It is the establishment of anonymous, 
impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held 
together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous 
complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced 
locally and idiosyncratically by the micro groups themselves (2006: 56).  
 
Since this kind of cultural production occurred within two groups that are the 
modernizing elite and modernized society, inevitably the modernization process 
created a tension between the values of the West and East, urban and rural, modern 
and traditional which reverberated in social and cultural arenas which would be an 
issue of the Yeşilçam melodramas where non-Muslim minorities are placed and 
caricaturized with one dimensional portrays as criticism to the Western values.  
Under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, Turkey accepted the category of non-Muslims as 
minorities and granted minority rights only to, Armenians, Jews and Greeks, such as 
education in their own language but Kurds and other Muslim, such as Arabs and 
Alevis, were not even regarded as minorities hence exempt of such benefits. 
Although Muslim Arabs, Kurds and Albanians revolted against the state, says Avner 
Levi, the distinction of otherness formed over religion. With new legislations 
discrimination felt in cultural and economical spheres of the society where non-
Muslims excluded not only from public services, but put out of ranks from social, 
economical and professional fields such as free movement in Anatolia, stock market 
and trade businesses which were mainly handed by non-Muslims during Ottoman 
times. At the end of the 20s, Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş/Citizen Talk Turkish campaign 
was launched which made talking in other languages harder in public places. Thus, 
minorities were forced to talk proper Turkish without an accent. Other restrictions 
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such as ban from public service between 1926- 1965, and 1929 issued ban from stock 
exchange business and restrictions on free travel until 1930 particularly affected 
economic aspects of minority lives (Balcı, 2013: 30-37). These acts, as Gül 
Yaşartürk states, are part of the efforts regarding creating a national bourgeois class 
(2012: 20) and bring industry and trade businesses to Muslim Turks. Although some 
rights were granted to minorities, much more were taken from them. Consequently, 
along with other reasons, the minority population diminished considerably.    
A. Gül Altınay states that during the nation state formation, “the transition from a 
multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural empire to a Turkish nation state was a 
very painful one. For some communities, such as Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, 
[exile] meant destruction to the extent that Armenian life in Anatolia became 
virtually extinct” (2007:23). As a result of rising nationalism not only Armenians but 
also Greek origin, Rum, citizens were mistreated on various occasions such as 
population exchange in the mid-1920s, Wealth Tax of 1942, ransacking of property, 
churches and cemeteries on 6-7 September 1955 and the 1964 deportation. During 
the “Thrace Events of 1934”, most of the assaulted Jew citizens had to flee to 
İstanbul form Thracian cities. (Balcı, 2013: 40). Keyder states expulsion, deportation, 
massacre and exchange of Greek and Armenians was not welcomed in Anatolia since 
they were the only medium through which Muslim Anatolians had experienced 
peripheralization in daily life. At the end, some nine-tenths of Christian population, 
around one-sixth of the total population Anatolia was eliminated. (1997: 43-44).  
As a result of anti-minority policies, the regression of religious minority population 
led to the Islamization of Anatolia. The remaining ones are treated as outsiders or 
discriminated which is still an issue of the present day. While performing 
Turkishness, non-Muslim citizens are often obliged to keep silent about their 
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backgrounds and try to mingle in society (Neyzi, 2002: 138), and passed as Turks 
with false names and we may assume the same for Muslim minorities of Alevis and 
Kurds. “By the late 20s, state historians and social scientists began to build a new 
ancestry for the Kurds, stating that they have descended from Turkmen tribes, and, 
thus ‘Mountain Turks’” […] by the mid 20s speaking Kurdish was banned along 
with Kurdish names. (Arokan, 2014: 146). Moreover, starting from the first years of 
the Republic, Kurdish folkloric songs had been compiled from various cities like 
Antep, Adana, Urfa, Maraş and Diyarbakır. The first of the four visits held in 1926 
by a delegation from Darülelhan/ The House of Melodies Music School (now 
İstanbul University Conservatory) compiling 250 songs. Followed by 1938 visit of 
Ankara University Conservatory with 491 songs, 1967 visit of TRT (Turkey’s 
Public Broadcasting Authority)  involves whole Turkey resulted with 1738 song. 
Last visit in 1976 was held by Ministry of Culture focuses on solely Urfa and 
resulted with 300 folk songs (Yücel, 2008: 42, emphasis is mine). This cultural 
erosion of 50 years is a price Kurds paid for not being recognized as a minority. 
Moreover, oppressive practices and assimilation policies increased to the extent of 
“Turkification”, and from the 30s onwards, a state struggle was initiated against 
masses that don’t identify themselves as Turks.  
This practice went as far as emptying Kurdish villages to fill them with 
Turkish speaking populations and changing the Kurdish names of the villages 
into Turkish ones. Turning Kurds into Turks was portrayed as a civilizing 
mission to eradicate tribalism and feudalism. Between 1925 and 1938, tens of 
thousands of Kurds and Alevis were deported to Western Turkey (Arakon, 
2014:147).  
 
Not only Kurds but also Alevis suffer from discrimination and oppression whose 
religious practices are not educated at schools whereas Sunni religious lessons are 
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compulsory. Gündüz Vassaf suggests that there is a strong enmity towards Kurd and 
Alevis and states, “they are ‘othered’ and considered as the agents of foreign forces 
that threaten our state and our unity and oppose our religion one-ness” (quoted in 
Dönmez-Colin, 2008: 91). Although some important steps have been taken, still, the 
official definition of being Turkish requires Turkish ethnicity, Turkish language and 
Sunni Islam- other than these are perceived as others. However Turkishness 
discourse has changed in time, moreover new identity formations have emerged. 
  
3.1.2. Transformation of the Country 
Relatively still waters of the country began to run deep in 1960 with the first military 
intervention, followed by 1971 intervention which was followed by era of 
polarization of the country through violent acts among left-wing, right-wing and 
Islamist political groups which led to another military intervention in 1980 that have 
interrupted and mediated the production of nationalist discourses of the state. Due to 
1980 coup d’état and global changes, starting from the 80s Turkey has undergone 
significant alterations in terms of nationalism and modernism. Along with rapid 
urbanization the country shifted from the nationalist developmentalism to 
transnational market strategy. General imposition of high culture has come to an end 
where people had started acted upon their own will regarding from choice of music 
to outfit. As Reşat Kasaba states, by the 80s, Turkish people lost their enthusiasm 
towards the nation state and had become suspicious and cynical about the promises 
of “enlightened and prosperous tomorrows” and they had started to “inquire about 
the histories, institutions, beliefs, identities and cultures from which they have been 
forcefully separated” (1997: 16). This sudden liberal wind changed the positions of 
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the individuals from being an object of the modernization project to subject of their 
lives and during the 80s and 90s two major changes experienced in political arena; 
rise of the Islamic movement and Kurdish ethnic separatism. Before addressing these 
issues I will briefly touch upon the political, economic and social sphere during the 
70s and early 80s which led to irrevocable changes in the country.  
The nationalist and developmentalist policies of the state had come to a halt in the 
late 70s. 1973 world oil crisis led to severe domestic economic crisis in Turkey, 
followed by several embargos and foreign policy dispute with Greece over Cyprus. 
Moreover the country was polarizing politically between leftist and rightist which 
ended with 1980 Coup. Turkey faced the fail of state policy of import substituting 
industrialization -protecting the domestic market, inward oriented industrial 
development depended on ideological elements of nationalism and 
developmentalism- which led to inevitable expanding in foreign debt followed by 
crisis in development in the late 70s. In the early 80s Turkey shifted radically from 
statist-nationalist economic strategy to market oriented global one which was carried 
out by the military regime of the time. Thus, state’s populist and socially 
redistributionist role drastically changed. The economy policies in the reconstruction 
period only benefited a limited segment of the society excluding majorities. This 
authoritarian and exclusionary period brought a harsh break from nationalism where 
a new ideology flourished that is competitive individualism which changed economy, 
politics and culture. And long waited economic development was achieved not 
through the nationalist strategy but after aligning with the world economy. Thus, the 
developmentalism and nationalism failed hand in hand along with the virtues of 
Eurocentrism as markers of Western superiority, such as rationalism, the nation-state, 
and economic development. (Gülalp, 1997: 52-56) 
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The modernization process of Turkey had displaced Islam for the sake of 
secularization. Despite secularization, the first religious prone party Millet Partisi 
/Nation Party was established in 1948, followed by Milli Nizam Partisi/ National 
Order Party in 1970 whose legacy has reached today. Cinema affected from Islamic 
movement in the early 60s where an Islamic cinematic trend was born: Milli 
Sinema/National Cinema which focused on the identity of Turks within the Islam-
Turk “framework of commercial considerations, but always with a religious 
meaning” (Dönmez-Colin, 2008: 40).  
Religion based politics showed its face again in the political arena during the 80s, an 
era which is characterized by integration with global capitalism accompanied with 
the confidence lost in the nation-state. Haldun Gülalp suggests that failed 
developmentalism and frustration towards the promises of Westernist modernization 
is the driving force behind Islamic movement. His argument relies on that this failure 
laid grounds for foundation of radical Islamism which condemned nationalism as a 
fruitless project, and its contradictory promises that ended up in crisis (1997: 55-57). 
However, crisis in modernism didn’t lead to postmodern criticism of meta-narratives 
or other political solutions but rather inclined towards religion and a very offensive 
stance towards nation-state and its promises of Westernization, modernization, and 
ultimately towards Kemalism. Hence, rise of conservatism and political Islam cannot 
be alone analyzed through economic failure. It is useful for explaining why an 
oppositional movement is born, but it lacks of reasoning the power of the movement. 
Nilüfer Göle gives a very useful guideline suggesting that “the rise of Islamic elite 
and intellectuals is tied to a historical backdrop that had been invisible to the 
republican elite until the outbreak in the 1980s” (quoted in Arslan, 2011: 250). She 
says the rise of political Islam can be understood “through examining how the 
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Western ideal of modernity is reconstructed and internalized locally and how the 
power relations between modernist elites and Islamic movements take shape” (Göle, 
1997: 83). Keeping in mind the cultural effects of this process, the changes in 
lifestyle, gender roles, identities, it is evident all these changes were being criticized 
by the Islamist movement who were forced to live under secular rules which they 
hadn’t believed or wanted. 
As Göle underlines Turkish modern elites had aimed secularization, rationalization, 
and nation building through the traditional ideological positivism and solely 
concentrated on progress through national unity. Therefore, all kinds of differences 
namely ethnic, ideological, religious and economic were considered as ‘toxic’, “not 
as natural components of a pluralistic democracy but as sources of instability and as 
threats to unity and progress” (1997: 84). Evidently this anti-liberal and paranoid 
discourse alienated not only minorities but conservatives and traditionalists. 
Modernists of the society decided, what was civilized and what was not, “everything 
that is alafranka is deemed proper and valuable; anything alaturka acquires a 
negative connotation and is somehow inferior” (Göle, 1997: 85). This imposed idea 
of superiority of the Western values criticized by the masses due to emotional, 
personal and symbolic values. The gap between the value systems of the two parties 
created a tension where people forced to make choices between traditional self 
definitions and “civilized” constructions. These values were rejected by the masses 
in the society but the rise of the oppressed through political agenda could not have 
flourished until the suitable political, economical and social sphere reveals itself. 
Regarding the alienation of masses Dönmez-Colin states that secular policies, along 
with its failure to solve the miserable life conditions of the majority, alienated not 
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only people of Anatolia but also minorities such as Kurds who couldn’t find their 
places in the new society (2008: 14).  
Another important event in the rise of political Islam is the 1980 coup d’état whose 
ideology is explicitly supported already strong notion of Turkish-Islam synthesis. It 
is a fact that during the social upheaval of the late 70s, the discourses and politics 
based on Turkish-Islam synthesis were used in disadvantage of leftists, minorities 
and Kurds. Emre Kongar underlines that the architect of the Coup General Kenan 
Evren referred to religion, since all the political parties were closed, because he was 
in need of political support. Religious education, but only in Sunni terms, became 
obligatory where religious high school graduates were allowed to choose any 
profession they like (2001: 187). And the coup is crowned with the 1982 
Constitution, the most anti-democratic and unprogressive constitution in Turkey, 
which imposed tight controls on freedom of speech, organizations, and political 
activities. Moreover, it explicitly defined citizenship along with Turkishness. Still in 
force, Article 66 of the Constitution asserts: ‘Each person bound to the Turkish state 
though citizenship is a Turk’, nothing less, nothing more. 
Socio-economical transformations, consecutive military interventions, political 
oscillations, rising Kurdish nationalism and violence mark the 80s and 90s. The neo-
liberal policies had positive outcomes towards integration with global markets 
however; these policies widened the income and wealth gap among the society. The 
new social order was not about collective, communal or relying on protocols of 
Turkification, as Savaş Arslan underlines, but about individual capitalist order, the 
interpreting of Turkification and Western values on a personal level and rise of 
Islamism (2011: 209). Tanıl Bora lists the significant events of the 90s for Turkey as: 
changing borders and conflicts, rising minority and human right discourses, EU 
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oriented economic deregulation, Gulf War, and changing geopolitical sphere which 
triggered the possibility of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. The last event drew 
Turkey’s attention on Kurdish problem in her soil. During this time the solution to 
Kurdish problem oscillated between military solution and democratization (2003: 
434-436).  
Kurdish problem can be acknowledged as one of the main social, political and 
military concerns of the country since the early 80s. The establishment of the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in 1974 which aimed to establish an independent 
Kurdistan claiming land from Turkey, and from neighboring countries Syria, Iran 
and Iraq is the beginning of the tense relationship between the state and the Kurds. 
Gönül Dönmez- Colin (2008: 89) states that long time restrictions and bad economic 
conditions gained political consciousness to Kurds.  
 
The power of the modern nation state to control the lives of its citizens has 
often forced individuals to play conflicting roles that have fragmented their 
identity. The banning of Kurdish language, Kurdish proper names, even 
Kurdish songs, has had repercussions in politicizing Kurdish consciousness, 
particularly in the rural areas of the south-east where remnants of feudalism 
and dismal living conditions have thwarted development.  
 
Although the issue of underdevelopment is not only peculiar to Kurdish population 
in Turkey, along with the identity crisis, it is one of the fundamental reasons behind 
the unrest in the predominantly Kurdish populated south-east. However, this political 
consciousness, starting from 1984, started putting its claims through terrorist 
activities which caused the death of more than 30.000 until now.  
In 1990 first Kurdish political party Halkın Emek Partisi (People’s Labor Party) was 
established and entered the political sphere. Although it was closed by the Supreme 
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Court in 1993, it was followed by other parties which all either extinguished or 
closed and some of their members of the Parliament were imprisoned. The 90s can 
be considered as an era of intense terrorist attacks caused immense civilian 
casualties. After the arrest of the PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, a temporary 
ceasefire and peace period began at the beginning of the 2000s, however, terror has 
not ended yet. Kurdish separatist movement irrevocably changed the political arena 
and with the help of changes in the law regarding closure of political parties, today 
Kurdish movement has a place in the Parliament and indisputable supremacy in the 
South-East Anatolia Region of the country. Finally Turkey has come to a point 
where: 
 
The global revival of religious discourses and civilizational clashes has 
coincided with three separations in Turkey: between the West (EU in 
particular) and the non West (Turkey in particular), the secular (Kemalists) 
and the Islamic (identified with the ruling party AKP), and Turks (nationalists 
and the Turkish army) and Kurds (Kurdish nationalists and the PKK). Despite 
the so-called trans-nationalist moves, nationalism is not withering away, but 
instead creating violent outbreaks against non-Turks and non-Muslims living 
in Turkey […] The killing of the Armenian Turkish intellectual Hrant Dink or 
the attacks against Christian priests in 2007 can be understood as instances of 
such outbreaks (Arslan, 2011: 252).  
 
Consequently maybe Turkishness and nationalistic ideology is not the only and 
dominant discourse and has lost its power to different discourses, but still nationalistic 
discourse has a social value embraced in some parts of the society. Nationalist-
adventure TV serial and films Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak/The Valley of the Wolves: Iraq 
(Serdar Akar, 2005) and Kurtlar Vadisi: Terör/The Valley of the Wolves: Terror 
(Serdar Akar, 2007) fuse three ideologies: “nationalism, conservatism and Islamism” 
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(Dönmez-Colin: 2008: 34) where Kurds represented as enemies, untruthful and 
unreliable people.  
Tanıl Bora stresses that bleeding Turkish nationalism gained power through the 90s 
due to several factors such as the treat to the nation state due to globalization, the 
crisis of socio-economical self confidence due to economic and political crisis of the 
early 90s, and increasing Kurdish problem not only in Turkey but also in neighboring 
countries particularly in Iraq due to US invasion. All of these facts helped 
construction of a contemporary nationalistic discourse with four fronts: official 
Kemalist discourse, left-wing Kemalist nationalism, liberal pro-Western nationalism, 
and most importantly racist/ethicist nationalism fed by anti-Kurdish precisions. 
However, this quadruple structure is complicated by the rising discourse of Islamism 
(2003: 436). This multilayered and complex society has multiple and sometimes 
intertwined discourses as in Islamist-nationalist and Kurdish-leftist and so forth which 
reveal themselves in media productions.  
Turkish media in general and cinema in particular inscribe these severe ideological 
separations. In the early 90s a new Islamic movement Beyaz Sinema (White 
Cinema), was born and gained significant success with films like Minyeli Abdullah/ 
Abdullah of Minye (Yücel Çakmaklı, 1989) and Yalnız Değilsiniz/ You Are not Alone 
(Mesut Uçakan, 1990). As Dönmez-Colin notes, “such films have been oriented 
reclaiming the Muslim self, which was perceived as having been robbed of its 
authenticity and heritage.” She adds that they drew large audience in Anatolia “who 
face alienation in an urban environment”. But due to their lack of artistic quality 
“white cinema didn’t establish itself a genre […] Gradually, the newspapers, 
journals, TV stations and web sites owned or subsidized by rich Islamist 
industrialists/businessmen inside and outside Turkey have replaced white cinema to 
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carry on struggle to re-imagine Islamist political identity” (2008: 46-48). On the one 
hand secularist media continues to reproduce their version of Republican 
modernization, as Arslan notes, on the other their Islamic counterparts disseminate 
religious propaganda and visualize new born culture of Islamist bourgeoisie (2011: 
252). Therefore, the next part will discuss why production of representations under 
different discourses matter and what are the social results of these representations in 
long term. 
  
3.2. Representation of Turkish and Minority Identities 
Having briefly discussed how being Turk is defined, how minorities were defined 
and treated, how a nation was born and changed in time now the study will focus on 
identity representations. To this end the connection between national identity, 
national narrative, and memory will be studied to stress the importance of 
representations in identity building of all kinds. 
  
3.2.1. Identity and Collective Memory 
At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, culture was considered as the main structural 
element of nation-states and was used all around Europe and in Turkey as an 
integration instrument. To achieve this objective, state aimed to construct collective 
memories through shared mental structures, and imposed common ways of thinking, 
understanding and vision to shape national characteristics through certain 
representations that are shaped by a nationalistic ideology. Eventually, these images 
constitute memories and identities that are "constructed through, not outside, 
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difference" (Hall, 1996: 4); a fact that draws our attention to the others and/or 
minorities.  
James Morreal stresses that “as an integral part of the pattern of culture, an image, by 
its very nature, will operate within and at most levels of society (1987:250). Images 
hold a prominent position in Western culture and advanced technologies transform 
our sense of the world, rather than representing it, and create our reality. This process 
leads to constant oscillation between the myth of ideal life and lived reality which 
enables memory, more than ever, open to manipulation. Consequently, there is no 
pure, pristine memory beneath restoration and manipulation caused by the various 
and changing representations. But how memory is built and manipulated? From a 
multinational empire to a nationalist nation, how can one perceive its place in the 
community? In Benedict Anderson's words, "all profound changes in consciousness, 
by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias” (1991:208) which may 
be essential and healthy for mind. In this sense, while creating a new sense of 
Turkishness and Turkish nation, decision makers contributed to the nation forgetting 
the multi ethnic life in the empire and make them adjust to a new one with brand new 
representations. Through an ideological perspective, a collective memory was 
created involving new representations where Turkishness was holding the upper 
hand before all others. “Collective memories are usable, facilitating cultural, social, 
and economic connections; establish social order, and determining belonging, 
exclusivity, solidarity and continuity” (Zelizer, 1998: 4). Thus, supported with 
symbols and rituals of the shared values, newly founded identities almost seemed 
natural in collective memory which became an insurance policy for unity and 
prosperity of the newly founded nation.  
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Complex and ambiguous, memory is central to human identity and is structured by 
the interaction of individual subjectivity with cultural and social conditions. With the 
advent of photography, cinema and advanced technologies human memory is subject 
to manipulation and new sources of preservation next to traditional ones of history 
books, journals, textbooks, museums. Thus, whenever a memory is constituted some 
questions should be asked: by and for whom, what is the contextual background, and 
through which oppositions. The latter is one of the main concerns of this study.  
In the 1920s French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs began to study what he calls 
“collective memory” and “instead of viewing collective memory as the past working 
its will on the present, Halbwachs explored “the ways in which the present concerns 
determine what of the past we remember and how we remember it.” Thus he 
underscores the ahistorical even anti-historical feature of the collective memory 
which simplifies the multiple perspectives and ambiguities in order to reduce events 
to mythic archetypes. To him, contrary to historical conscious, memory insists on 
continuing presence (Novick, 2000:3-4), and becomes a useful discourse for uniting 
any given community around eternal and essential truths which are timeless. Novick 
adds that contrary to Freud who assumes memory as an imposition, Halbwachs 
considers it as chosen (ibid: 5). However, the choices are not individual but made by 
leading discourses, institutions or ideologies hence memory becomes political. 
Halbwachs’ conception of memory is interplay of image and narrative, in his words; 
“recollections are nothing but images” (1992: 170).  
Thus, controlling the means of cinematic production has become a social power in 
contemporary societies. In this way, not only representations but also certain ways of 
remembering imposed through cinema. Having underlined the importance of 
collective memory and the contribution of cinema to it, I will examine how dominant 
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discourse shaped the collective memories through image systems using certain 
representations. In order to comprehend how representations internalized by society 
first I will first discuss how the symbolic forms manifest themselves through image 
systems.  
 
3.2.2. Image System 
“One inserts himself between the object and the camera” 
Federico Fellini 
 
An ordinary cinema audience has no direct influence on any kind of knowledge 
production. On the other hand, powerful agents control the discourse easily by 
setting the norms, selecting the actors, language, topics and agenda. Eventually they 
are the decision makers who decide what will be told to whom in which terms. In the 
realm of media, with this power, competent agents create a potential, and an indirect, 
control to some extent in the mind of the audience. According to Antonio Gramsci’s 
theory of ideological hegemony, as Carl Boggs states, mass media are tools that 
ruling elites use to “perpetuate their power, wealth and status [by popularizing] their 
own philosophy, culture and morality” (in Lull, 1995: 32). Throughout this study 
Republican discourse and nationalistic ideology are mentioned and the use of media, 
particularly cinema, is referred as a method for gaining and maintaining power. For 
long years Kemalist hegemony was in force through which dominant ideology was 
transmitted, consciousness was formed and social power was exercised. And it 
succeeded because cultural production in general, cinema in particular, as Kaarle 
Noordenstreng puts; “introduced elements into individual consciousness that would 
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not otherwise appear there, but will not be rejected by consciousness because they 
are so commonly share in cultural community” (in Lull: 1995: 32).  
It is evident mass media is not comparable to no individual, institution or group when 
it comes to disseminating certain discourses or an ideology. Until the 80s, media 
monopoly saturated society with their preferred ideological agenda and that allowed 
nationalism to reign since every medium worked in tandem to disseminate and 
legitimate certain symbolic forms. In visual media these symbolic forms manifest 
themselves in image systems. James Lull states that spread of dominant ideologies 
depends on use of image systems, of which there are two basic types: ideational and 
meditational.  
Ideational image system is composed of units of ideational representation, complex 
internal forms of organization, and particular preferred interpretations. (1995: 9-10). 
In the context of Yeşilçam films and their minority stereotypes, we may say ideology 
is not only made up from certain representations but also from a grammar of 
production with certain codes through which cinema imposes a way of perceiving 
minorities through projected imagined worlds. Repeated stereotyped characters of 
minorities through certain conventions stick in collective memories that linger for 
long years. Due to heavy nationalistic rhetoric in cinema, minorities often ridiculed, 
condemned or despised through negative stereotyping. And, these repeated 
presentation of the predominant ideology continued to define culture for people who 
are heavily exposed to media. Republican discourse was directly imperative and 
supposedly acted in the best interest of people who clearly needed guidance in every 
aspect of life, and Yeşilçam guided them with ideational image systems.  
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Mediational image system refers to framing content in such a way that standardized 
presentational formats themselves connote to particular ways of thinking and how 
people internalize above mentioned ideological productions and make use of them in 
their daily lives. To Gramsci, dominant ideological discourses must be subsequently 
reproduced in the activities of basic social units in everyday life and hegemony 
requires that ideological claims become self-evident cultural assumptions. Its 
effectiveness lies in people’s acceptance of fiction as reality (Lull, 1995: 33-34). This 
is called the process of social mediation where ideology is made part of everyday 
life, and ideological representations are recognized, interpreted and used in 
construction of daily life. These processes are also the part of the ideological effect 
of the media because even trivial extracts from films carry powerful ideological force 
once they circulate socially (Lull, 1995: 16-20). This is what Michel Foucault 
suggests about being both objects and subjects of power/knowledge. “[Foucault] 
suggested that the dominance of certain discourses occurred not only because they 
were located in socially powerful institutions but also their discourses claim the 
absolute truth” (Rose, 2007: 144). Thus imposed ideological representations become 
living entities in society. When it comes to minorities, mediation carries an enormous 
significance because “reality is framed according to prior media representations and 
their underlying assumptions and analogs so that mediated imaginary becomes the 
referent with which the ‘real world’ is often compared, an analytical inversion and 
ideological reification that carries enormous social implications” (ibid: 20).  
Through the eyes of dominant ideology minorities are still recognized as inferior to 
some extent. Consequently, there is still inferential racism, as Hall calls it, 
“naturalized representations or events and situations relating to race, whether 
“factual” or “fictional”, which have racists premises and propositions have inscribed 
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in them as a set of unquestioned assumptions” (1995:20). This kind of racism reveals 
itself in Yeşilçam films from imitation of the accents to mannerisms to emphasize 
Turkishness as the higher value.  
 
3.2.3. Representation of Turkish Identity 
For long years, the ruling elite of the Republic had set the rules for narrative choices 
which were implying specific emplotments, explicative models, and loaded with 
ideological stances. In this sense, selected ways of thinking were advocated through 
a variety of channels. The ongoing manipulation of public information empowered 
dominant ideology which helped to sustain the material and cultural interests of their 
creators’. The cultural sphere was shaped around the norms of the national identity 
which derived as mentioned earlier from “Turkification-from-above”. The state 
ideology established a cultural hegemony that did not allow for much public space 
and new cultural practices.  
Naturally, nationalism undertakes to redefine a collectivity as a community but as 
Keyder states; “Turkish nationalism placed special emphasis on the vulnerability of 
the new community, on its precarious viability in the face of hostile external forces. 
The state had to be intrepid in protecting it. Predictably, such a defense required in 
interdiction of internal dissent as well” (1997: 45-46). However, Turkey’s loneliness 
paranoia, the very component of modern Turkish identity, relies on the term ‘sick 
man of Europe’ which was attributed to the Ottoman Empire during the late 19th 
century. Thus, rigid and paranoid features of identity, which also ignored civil rights 
for the sake of the state, help us to understand the harsh and unwelcoming attitude 
towards minorities. We may say the minority representations are the cultural 
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extension of this nationalistic discourse in political arena. Turkishness not only 
affirmed with these representations but also protected with “severe censorship laws, 
inspired by Mussolini’s Codice di Censura (Censorship Law) established in 1939” 
which was abolished in 1998. Accordingly, a censorship board was created whose 
members were from the state departments including police and military who had the 
last saying on artistic production. And in some cases artist refused to conform and 
compensate were sent to prison or exile such as Yılmaz Güney. 
  
The censorship board ensured that that the films would be harmful to the 
undividable wholeness of the state- that would affect national independence, 
general morality, health and politics in a negative manner and insult national 
feelings, or have qualities not commensurate with the national culture, 
customs and traditions of the country- would not be approved for distribution 
(Dönmez-Colin: 2008:49, emphasis is mine).  
 
In this political atmosphere the cultural production in Turkish cinema until the 
1980s remained in a very tight sphere where minorities had a few to say, if none, on 
cinematic production. By homogenization and cultural integration, a dominant 
discourse and culture were legitimized whereas all other culture was suppressed and 
marginalized. Cinema has been remarkably successful at imposing Turkishness as a 
cultural norm. Similarly, while glorifying Turkishness through images and codes, 
Turkish cinema depicted social behaviors of the minorities through collective 
representations to classify and generalize them by ignoring the motivations, 
struggles and contradictions among the society. Keeping in mind that many 
individuals of the society had never met a minority in their lives and had had no 
firsthand experience, media representations were the sole source of social 
knowledge where cinema came up, as James Clifford says, only with “ethnographic 
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representations which were always partial and positioned” (in Abu-Lughod, 2001: 
142). Since social hierarchy runs something as follows: “ideal, normal, liminal, 
abnormal and counter-ideal” (Entman& Rojecki, 2000: 52) and Turkishness is 
accepted as the ideal trait, we may say the minorities fall in the categories from 
liminal to the latter ones. It is an ideal trait that, as Gündüz Vassaf notes, even 
“fictional heroes are brought to justice for insulting Turkishness” (Dönmez-Colin, 
2008:91). Although censorship was abolished in 1998, still presumed anti-Turkish 
discourses are considered as threats to Turkishness where columnists, authors and 
script writers are sued time to time.  
To this end, cinematic representation of the identities developed as inclusive and at 
the same time excluding practices where Turkishness and otherness are constructed. 
They evolved in a hierarchy between Turkishness, a construction depends on myths 
and distortions, and the marked others who were condemned one way or another. In 
this sense, what Richard Dyer says for whiteness can be adapted to Turkishness, 
“white people have power and believe that they think, feel and act like and for all 
people, unable to see their particularity, cannot take account for other people’s; 
white people create dominant images […] and don’t quite see that they thus 
construct in their own image” (2002: 12). In other words, Turks sets the standards of 
morality and manners by which they are bound to succeed and all others bound to 
fail. But what are these standards failed by the minorities, if not in society in the 
realm of Yeşilçam? 
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3.2.4. Representation of Minority Identities 
Although several ethnic and religious minorities (Laz, Bosnian, Alevi, Assyrian, 
Kurd, Jew, Greek, Armenian, Gypsy, Circassian, Pomak and etc.) constitute 
significant part of the population, from the early days of the Republic, Turkish 
cinema struggled to reinforce an imagined unity through often marginalizing the 
minorities. It is a known maxim that Turkey is a like a cultural mosaic, a melting 
pot, however; “Yeşilçam ignored the ethnic mosaic of the country in favor of the 
official state policy of national identity based on homogeneity regardless of the 
differences in religion, ethnicity or sexuality” (Dönmez-Colin, 2008: 15) and used 
culturally determined forms of representations. Melting pot argument is only 
beneficial if you had a proper Turkish name and no accent at all. It is a 
contradiction, if not an oxymoron, to alienate certain groups constantly and 
reinforce differences and prejudices towards the minorities where the aim is to unite 
a nation under an umbrella. Hence, representing the difference between Turkishness 
and the minorities carries significance since the former is built on the lacks of the 
latter which are generally constituted on language, moral codes and manners.  
In this sense representing Turkishness is an easier subject since it is associated with 
high moral values and manners. What about minorities of the very same society who 
live in similar conditions? As mentioned for long years only non-Muslims- Rums, 
Armenians and Jews- were represented in cinema. Since these representations are 
result of anti-minority policies and discourses, and understanding them would be 
helpful in analyzing Kurdish representations in cinema. In her comprehensive study 
regarding minority representations in Yeşilçam, Yeşilçam’da Öteki Olmak/Being 
Other in Yeşilçam (2013) Dilara Balcı draws our attention to how non-Muslim 
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minorities are marginalized politically, socially and culturally. I will refer to her 
study in this manner to reveal the codes of such representations.  
In Turkish cinema general, Yeşilçam particular, non-Muslims, they will be referred 
as minorities, were acted as decorative figures in narrative with a few dialogues. 
Their only function was to emphasize the cosmopolitan structure of İstanbul, if 
removed cohesion of the narratives would have stood still. Their irrelevance was 
materialized in a tavern scene in Beş Hasta Var/There Are Five Patients (Atıf 
Yılmaz, 1956), when a Turkish customer asks the tavern owner if his name was 
Yorgo and the answer is: Yorgo, Koço, Mihal, Aleko, Miço; what does the name 
change? (Balcı, 2013: 84-86), which can be interpreted the core of minority 
representations in mainstream Turkish cinema where they are approached as a 
commodity that is to be labeled and passed.  
In cinema one of the significant representation tools was the profession of the 
minorities who were the most educated ones of the society. According to 1945 
census, illiteracy was more common among Muslims with 76.1%, followed by 
Christians with 39.4%, and Jews with 34.5%. This education difference revealed 
itself in accommodated wealth and in time of crisis rather economic, psychological 
or identity, this fact turned to hostility towards minorities (ibid: 39). Education was 
in direct relation with the professions of the minorities. Not only they were active in 
industry and trade, but also were active all education-intensive professions from 
management, translation, medicine, banking to art. However this wide spread 
professions were limited with a few and minorities generally were represented as 
tavern and hostel owners, manner tutor, moneychanger, jeweler, dancer, singer, 
brothel owner, prostitute and so forth. Besides these professions Rums, being the 
beastly characters if not foes, were represented mostly as bandits, smugglers and 
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thieves, in short ordinary criminals if not enemy of the state in historical films. 
These profession attributions are dispersed carefully where Rum men are ultimate 
bad characters, and Rum women are represented as femme fatales in its worst. 
Besides being prostitute they sometimes are mistresses, brothel owners and 
smugglers. Although, in 1920 the number of certified prostitutes dispersed as “774 
Muslim, 691 Rum, 194 Armenian and 124 Jews” and in the same period out of 175 
brothels “79 were owned by Rums, 45 by Jews, 35 Armenians and 11 Turks” (Balcı, 
2013: 102) only Rums were explicitly related to sex and prostitution. They are 
represented exact opposites of imagined Turkish women who are mostly modest and 
sex-free. Sometimes Armenian women are represented as such but they are not 
villains and good people in heart. These Rum representations clearly draw attention 
to their lack of morals, bad manners and present them as antipathetic and unreliable 
people. Previously paranoid discourses of the state were mentioned and clearly Rum 
representations are in line with this ideology reinforcing the paranoid ideas 
regarding the enemies inside. Therefore in many films, especially in historical ones 
Rums are belittled, affronted and attacked verbally and physically. In Çakırcalı 
Mehmet Efe/Mehmet Efe of Çakırca (Yılmaz Atadeniz, 1969), besides verbal abuse, 
Rum bandits who were guilty of rubbing a Turk were “undressed full frontal and 
exposed to village community; a first in Turkish cinema in terms of exposure of 
male genitals” (ibid: 104).  
While Rums were represented as ultimate bad, Armenians were represented as 
comic, friendly and sympathetic characters. They were hostel owners, manner 
tutors, singers, absurd doctors, actors, sometimes tavern owners, photographers or 
tailors. These characters were represented in a friendlier manner as likeable 
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characters (Balcı, 2013: 109-121). They are the ones to be ridiculed not to be hated 
or despised like Rums.  
As the least represented minority, Jews were the most monotype and caricaturized 
ones. They were generally represented as jewelers, moneychangers and 
pawnbrokers; however, in real life most of the Jews were living wealthy lives 
dealing with industry and trade. Minority wealth was seen as a threat as a part of the 
nationalistic paranoia therefore the films abstained representing high class minority 
lives. (ibid: 123-126). As seen, Jews were related to materialism with negative 
connotations, such as interest, related to monetary business. It is clear that their real 
life wealth is approached with suspicion and their wealth accumulation was 
criticized through these representations clearly based on greed. And “since Jew were 
not liked Muslims/Turks, in many films they often were ridiculed, belittled, and 
affronted” (ibid: 181).  
Professional representations are very important because we don’t see any private life 
details regarding minorities. They are almost always lonely characters without 
family, children or kin; they are depicted in relation to their occupation; no religious 
or cultural object is viewed; no social or cultural life motifs were given such as 
schools, sanctuaries, cemeteries, celebrations, religious feasts, in Dilara Balcı’s 
words “even the minorities were Turkified” in these films. Moreover these 
characters are not in relation to their own ethnic group (ibid: 130-132).  
Another important emphasis, or the lack of it, is family life as if family concept is 
for Turks only. They are represented alone as if “one minority for each 
neighborhood”. They are either flat lonely or widows and if women, they certainly 
are not associated with motherhood which is also classified as a Turkish manner 
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(ibid: 132-134). Rothbart &John claimed people have tendency “to maximize the 
difference between the boundaries of groups and often treat overlapping 
characteristics as if they were non-overlapping” (Entman &Rojecki, 2000: 55) 
which is suitable for minority representations in Turkish cinema. If they were 
depicted in a family setting instead of ignoring the similarities of the lives, then an 
out group individual would be seen in favorable terms. These deliberate choices 
would derive both from nationalistic and discriminative discourse and the lack of 
interest and knowledge regarding minority lives which also can be considered as a 
result of the dominant discourse.  
As for motherhood and children, since children are recognized as the assurance of 
future, it seems to be believed that this assurance would be supplied by Turks only 
as if Turkey’s future would be exempt of minorities. Consequently these 
representations demonstrate minorities who are only in business or sexual relations 
with Turks and nothing more; they are not socially or culturally welcomed. The 
feelings towards them oscillate among hatred, resentment, dislike, ridicule and 
occasionally sympathy.  
These representations come with certain stereotypes which are decorated with 
human weaknesses personalized in greedy, sneaky, arrogant, unreliable, pedant and 
foul-mouthed characters. Hall states that “stereotyping reduces, essentializes, 
naturalizes and fixes ‘differences’ and deploys a strategy of splitting: “it divides the 
normal and acceptable from the abnormal and the unacceptable” (2003: 258). Thus 
‘normal’ Turks are separated from ‘abnormal’ minorities through these stereotypes.  
Minorities in cinema, for a long time, remained frozen in space and time while 
“setting up a symbolic frontier between insiders and outsiders, us and them” (Hall, 
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2003: 258) and worked as cultural short cuts. Richard Dyer notes that stereotypes 
help the dominant group in “applying their norms to subordinated groups, find the 
latter wanting, hence, inadequate, inferior, sick or grotesque and hence reinforcing 
the dominant groups’ own sense of legitimacy of the domination” (1977: 356) which 
has been a very typical practice of Yeşilçam. Savaş Arslan notes that the most 
influential intellectual and political positions in Yeşilçam involve leftist, Kemalist 
and Islamist ideologies which seem very different from each other but share a 
common feature of retrieving the lost pure Turkish essence (2011: 129). Eventually, 
these stereotypes and discourses helped to reconstitute dominance of Turkishness 
without drawing explicit attention to this affirmation. Now we will look closely to 
the minority stereotypes that mostly lived through time and became entities of their 
own which help us to understand what is being Turkish. Since minorities were 
passed by Turks, stereotyping confirmed the nation’s ability to be itself by 
incorporating the others. 
 
3.3. Minority Stereotypes in Turkish Cinema 
Stereotypes are not directly and visibly imposed upon individuals in a given society. 
Therefore visible cinematic representations carry importance in constructing and 
maintaining the stereotypes. One of the significant aspects of them is they “are to be 
momentarily enjoyed by insiders, are assumed to be ‘just stereotypes”. The outsider 
is in a different position—their very being does not distance themselves from the 
stereotypes” (Billig, 2005: 165). Another important aspect is they are passed orally 
or visually from one generation to another. H. R. Trevor-Roper draws our attention 
to its contagious nature: “Once established, creates, as it were, its own folklore, 
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which becomes in itself a centralizing force. And because separate persons attached 
their illusions to the same imaginary pattern, they made that patterns real for other” 
(in Morreal, 1987: 251). By this way, a stereotype can be reproduced over an 
extended time period as seen in Turkish cinema where still Greek women are 
depicted as prostitutes such as in Güz Sancısı/Pains of Autumn (Tomris Giritlioğlu, 
2009) and Son Osmanlı Yandım Ali/The Last Ottoman the Knock-Out Ali (M. Şevki 
Doğan, 2007) where Greeks are French and English collaborators who are depicted 
as immoral and incompetent.  
Morreal’s observation is particularly important for Yeşilçam since it had unwritten 
rules for representing minorities through marking otherness within a limited 
discourse to highlight what is not Turkishness. Dönmez- Colin states that traditional 
Yeşilçam depicted minorities one-dimensional such as mature Armenian women, 
called Madame, as tutors of Turkish girls, Greeks often as old fishermen called 
“uncle” or spinsters, Jews with small commerce. These stereotypes to some extent 
reflect the truth, were not completely fabricated, since in real life many Armenian 
women were hired as governesses, İstanbul Turks had Armenian or Greek neighbors 
called uncle and Jewish shopkeepers who had Turkish names. Turks had daily 
contact with only these non-Muslims which were the assimilated ones. However, in 
real life most of the minorities were not assimilated by the society, were affluent and 
lived wealthy lives beyond the imagination of the majority. They socialized with 
their community in their own language, spent summers at summer houses, had 
professional jobs like doctors, dentists and industrialists, and they were not in service 
of Turks, contrary they employed them (2008: 109-110). These lives were 
deliberately distorted in cinema and we only experienced Turkified stereotypes that 
doesn’t wear crucifix necklaces, or celebrate Christmas or Passover. 
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What James Morreal says about the effects of the stereotypes in long term is very 
significant for Yeşilçam stereotypes. Stereotyping can proceed virtually “unhindered 
and unchallenged, the image can stand apart from all circumstance, a separable 
entity, an icon” (1987: 251) which leaves a mark in collective memory. Minority 
stereotyping has significance also because as Walter Lippman underlines: “The 
subtlest and most pervasive off all influences are those which create and maintain 
repertory of stereotypes. We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine 
most things before we experience them. And those perceptions, unless education has 
made us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception” (in Morreal, 
1987: 250). Since education is also highly ideological, unfortunately his thoughts 
about benefits of education in struggle to stereotypes seem very optimistic.  
In order to create stereotypes there should be gross inequalities of power which is 
directed against the subordinate or the excluded group. And eventually these 
stereotypes serve to fixing boundaries and exclude everything that doesn’t belong to 
the norm (Hall, 1997a: 258). The power in representation is power to classify and 
name, to have the last saying on who will be represented and how. Then we face a 
struggle for hegemony over the images. Richard Dyer draws attention the relation 
between stereotyping and hegemony which requires widespread consent and appears 
not only natural but also inevitable: 
 
The establishment of normalcy through and stereotypes is one aspect of the 
ruling groups- a habit of such enormous political consequences that we tend 
to think of it as far more premeditated than actually is- to attempt to fashion 
the whole of society according to their own world view, value-system, 
sensibility and ideology. So right is this world view for the ruling groups that 
they make it appear (as it does to them) as natural and inevitable- and for 
everyone- and, in so far as they succeed, they establish their hegemony (Dyer, 
2006: 356).  
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Dyer’s observation is true to core for Turkish cinema as well. As Dilara Balcı (2013) 
underlines Yeşilçam was never interested depicting the daily or family lives of 
minorities’, their culture, religious services, and other celebrations. Minorities were 
always side acts, never the center of the story where each minority has its own 
stereotypes with different characteristics which tell us significant things how the 
society perceive them. The only feature they share is the bad use of Turkish, heavy 
accents which differ also from each other. This lack of language is sometimes used 
for humor and the other times just to underline the difference of their ethnicity.  
 
3.3.1. Rums, Armenians and Jews 
Rums were the most populated minority, and as mentioned in the previous part, in 
cinema they were the least liked characters, immoral and almost hostile ones. Young 
Rum men are mostly bandits, criminals, smugglers or state enemies in historical 
productions working for megola idea (great ideal), and women are prostitutes or 
potential prostitutes, dancers, singers, brothel owners; they are not to be married but 
to have fun. They are emphasized through immoral behaviors to shine out the main 
Turkish leading lady as in Safa Önal films Ağlayan Melek/Crying Angel (1970) and 
Bir Genç Kızın Romanı/Novel of a Young Girl (1971). These negative stereotypes 
identify Rum women directly with prostitution as if no Rum housewives were living 
in the country. Stereotypes of Rum men identify them with savageness, felony and 
treason. In result they are dissolute and unreliable people as in 
Umutsuzlar/Desperates (Yılmaz Güney, 1971) where Rum Stavro is a smuggler and 
a ruthless killer. Seeing a stereotyped minority in Kurdish Güney’s film proves 
inevitable power of stereotypes in representations.  
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Another Rum stereotype is middle aged or old, chubby and happy tavern owner 
“Barba” commonly named Kosti, Stavro, İspiro or Niko, restaurateurs and waiters 
whose only concern is to serve his Turkish customers as Barba Kosti in Ağlayan 
Melek/Crying Angel (Safa Önal, 1970) and Barba Niko in Haracıma Dokunma/Don’t 
Touch My Racket (1965) (Balcı, 2013: 106-108). These men depicted linked to 
alcohol selling places. These characters are not as bad as the first group but they earn 
a living from selling alcohol in Muslim neighborhood. Since in prostitution only 
women are condemned and the customers are exempted any social reaction, then we 
may assume the same social hypocrisy in tavern business as well.  
Armenian stereotypes are more cheerful than the Rum ones. As mentioned before 
good hearted Rum is very hard to find but Armenians are friendly people with some 
eccentricities. The first type is hostel owner middle aged, widow, bad mouthed, 
funny, money-minded but good hearted “Madam” with heavy make-up and prone to 
young Turkish men. They are generally called with typical names such as Surpik, 
Margarit, Agavni and Nuvark as Madama Nuvark in Seviştiğimiz Günler/The Days 
We Made Love (Halit Refiğ, 1961) and Madama Margarit in Siyah Gelinlik/The 
Black Wedding Gown (Orhan Elmas, 1973). These frump, sweet-rough characters, 
although being mostly stingy and selfish, are liked by the audience due to her funny 
manners including her bad mouth. (Balcı, 2013: 109). The second type is again 
widow or spinster, educated, arrogant, pedant women characters who teach Western 
manners to young Turkish women such as Madame Bulbulyan character in Rüyalar 
Gerçek Olsa/If Dreams Could Come Through (Hulki Saner, 1972) where she accuses 
the Turkish character by saying: “Dance, music, table manners, stylish dressing- you 
know nothing” (Dönmez-Colin: 2008:32). “Dresses in Western style, cares for hair 
and make-up and not caricaturized as the Madam stereotype”, this is an indispensable 
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character for Pygmalion type comedies such as Kara Gözlüm/My Dark Eyed One 
(Atıf Yılmaz (1970). During the education they are mocked and ridiculed by their 
pupil and the humor born from puns, malapropisms and word games; language 
difference is the main source of humor. (Balcı, 2013: 110-113) 
Absurd doctor stereotype’s can be considered as the male version of the tutor who is 
highly eccentric who seems to know a little about medicine as in İlk Göz Ağrsı/The 
First Love (Nejat Saydam, 1963) and Küçük Hanımın Şoförü/The Driver of the 
Damsel (Tunç Başaran, 1970) Although in real life Rums were practicing medicine, 
this relatively positive stereotype was considered worthy for Armenians (ibid: 113-
114).  
As mentioned before, Jew stereotypes are monotype and highly caricaturized and the 
least visualized. The stereotypes are ruthless, stingy, bleak, coward and strict 
bargainers generally deal with antiques, jewelry and exchange. They are often very 
“thin characters with sunken cheeks reinforced with extra make-up and goat beard 
(ibid: 92). I suggest these physical features also refer to their exaggerated stinginess. 
The implication is clear; a tight-fisted character doesn’t even eat. Although other 
minorities have rather personal relations with Turks, these characters have limited 
encounters with Turks, “they are not friends, lovers or foes” (ibid: 145) but jewelers 
as in Kozanoğlu (Atıf Yılmaz, 1967) and Balıkçı Osman/Fisherman Osman (Nejat 
Okçugil, 1973), or pawnbroker and lawn sharks as in Üç Arkadaş/Three Fiends 
(Memduh Ün, 1971).  
Furthermore, professions of kantocu (sanger), singer and actress were divided 
between Rum and Armenian women as in Rum kantocu Niça in Arab Abdo/Arabic 
Abdo (Remzi Jöntürk, 1973) and Armenian kantocu Hayganuş in Haracıma 
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Dokunma/Don’t Touch My Racket (Hasan Kazankaya, 1965). Although they execute 
the same profession, since Rum, Niça is unreliable unfaithful, selfish and more 
dangerous than Hayganuş who is a good hearted and faithful character (Balcı, 2013: 
116-117).  
Stereotypes in Turkish cinema are not limited with the above listed ones, but they are 
the most predominant ones give clues about the mental structure of the society 
especially regarding women. From the beginning of the national film production and 
through the rise of Yeşilçam, minority women depicted in specific ways such as 
scarlet women, mistresses, singing or dancing as in Gurbet Kuşları/The Birds of 
Nostalgia (Halit Refiğ, 1964) or brothel owners in Hasan Kazankaya films Haracıma 
Dokunma/Don’t Touch My Racket (1965) and Sayılı Kabadayılar/Special Rowdies 
(1965). Similarly films about the Ottomans, the Malkoçoğlu and Battalgazi films, 
depict Rum women as object of desire who easily submit themselves to the Turkish 
protagonists. The decisive feature of these stereotypes is lack of moral values of 
women who easily have extramarital intercourses; on the contrary Turkish women 
are connoted with chastity and modesty, they even don’t kiss. Good Turkish women 
were dictated to be chaste, delicate and loving. The ideal Turkish woman was an 
asexual creature whose emancipation came at the expense of her individuality and 
sexuality. Therefore, even if they have an extramarital affair for one night, they 
conceive child so sex would not be considered for the sake of sex but something 
more meaningful.  
Except villain Rum characters, all minority stereotypes are middle aged or old with 
no children or family. As if when these lonely characters die, there is nobody next to 
kin. And the young Rum villains are considered default childless due to their 
professions and life styles. Thus the future of Turkey is in the hands of pure Turkish 
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families. Considering the religious structure of the country now, discriminative and 
nationalist discourses seem to have worked well in this sense.  
Yeşilçam melodramas have significance for criticism of modernism through the use 
of minorities, othering of the West often emphasized through minorities. Social 
anxieties towards modernization and urbanization are the backbone of the classical 
Yeşilçam melodramas that were largely consumed by women. These films have a 
discourse where tradition is favored to “so called” artificial and pretension 
modernization and westernization of the educated urban upper classes that are 
represented with degenerated life style. Dilek Kaya states that envy for modernism 
and for being modern is articulated in these films, especially through women 
characters that should undergo a fundamental change by learning manners from non-
Muslim instructors who are depicted as ridiculous and snobbish (2010:420). These 
characters explicitly represent westernization and are used for criticism of western 
values through their artificial manners which underscores what Hall calls as 
“ambivalent nature of the difference” (2003: 238); westernization is affirmed but 
ridiculed at the same time. Criticism of Turkish antagonists often executed through 
anti-values dedicated to the minorities.  
Consequently, in Yeşilçam various ethnic communities were being subjected to 
homogenization through exaggeration and simplifying. Exaggerated lack of language 
skills is the main marker of these characters who are articulated to be mocked and 
laughed at by Turkish audience. These kinds of stereotypes were social and 
psychological reductions and clearly attempted to preserve a social distance between 
Turks and all the others to maintain a sense of ethnic superiority. 
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While discussing American white narrative and problem of minorities in media, 
Audrey Foster states that “for most white spectators, executives, producers and 
directors, the underrepresentation of the minorities is not a problem that they 
instinctively seek to correct. The white media power structure simply does not stand 
up and say, “We want better representations of people of ethnicities”, (2003: 94) 
which is also the case for most of the Turkish media agents. Drawing an analogy 
between whites and Turks, we may say Turks are everywhere in representation from 
writing, directing and acting, and moreover in media, politics and education. 
Although minorities worked in production of the films in Yeşilçam from music to 
editing, directing to acting, they were muted on the screen. And this imbalance of 
power and privilege conferred dominance for very long years.  
 
3.3.2. Changing Times, Changing Stereotypes 
The population of the non-Muslim minorities was regressed significantly during the 
70s due to discriminative policies and other political events such as Cyprus conflict. 
Today estimated Rum population is less than 1.500 people (Yaşartürk, 2012: 32), 
Armenian population is 40.000-60.000 and Jew population is around 35.000 people 
(Balcı, 2013: 43-46). Once they were mentioned in millions, now they diminished to 
thousands which make them a very small percentage of the total population. 
Evidently they now can’t be considered as a threat to any ideology, moreover they 
can’t be a reference to Turkishness since Turkishness has also lost its meaning. Thus, 
by the end of 70s not only minorities from society, but also these representations 
diminished significantly from cinema e.g. “the Armenian doctor” and “Jew insurance 
man” characters of İlk Göz Ağrsı/The First Love (Nejat Saydam, 1963) were both 
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replaced by Turkish characters in its 1975 remake Acele Koca Aranıyor/Urgent 
Husband is Wanted (Muzaffer Aslan) (Balcı, 2013: 114). Changing world and 
country dynamics, changing social life and urban immigration resulted with different 
representations in cinema such as workers in İstanbul immigrated from East, namely 
Kurds. Now the main other of the society is Kurds who are the people what Turks 
can’t be. Contrary to non-Muslim others who were educated, mostly wealthy and 
business and profession owners, Kurds are generally poor from an underdeveloped 
region, less educated and to some they are considered as belonging to the lowest 
scale of society. Therefore, their representation and stereotypes in mainstream rely 
on the general perception of the Kurds who are also more known to the society than 
the non-Muslims.  
Since they were not considered minorities Alevis or Kurds were altogether ignored 
by Yeşilçam. O da Beni Seviyor/Summer Love (Barış Pirhasan, 2001) can be 
acknowledged the only film in Turkish cinema about Alevi life. Due to their limited 
economic, cultural and symbolic capital, Kurds were absent from cinematic 
representation until the 1970s except exiled Yılmaz Güney who “depicted Turks and 
Kurds as suffering human beings under state oppression. Due to heavy censorship, 
which regularly condemned several of his films for leftist inclinations, he was 
obliged to deliver the Kurdish identity of his characters through circumlocution […] 
(in) Toprağın Gelini/Seyyit Han/ The Bride of the Earth/Seyyit Khan (1968), 
Umut/Hope (1970) and Endişe/Anxiety (1974) are about Kurdish people […] but 
Kurdish is never spoken. Güney tried to create a Kurdish atmosphere by the use of 
local elegies” (Dönmez-Colin, 2008:91-92).  
During the 70s mainstream cinema’s interest towards Kurds revolved around 
narratives including feudalism and rural Kurdish life realities such as berdel (bride 
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exchange), kuma (co-wife), bride price, vendetta, smuggling, and recently honor 
killings. The first three of the topics are woman center tragedies like Ezo Gelin/Ezo 
Bride (Feyzi Tuna, 1973) and Kuma/Co-Wife (Atıf Yılmaz, 1974) (Yücel, 2008: 94-
101). Bride price and vendetta are among the central themes of the Yeşilçam 
comedies of this study along with other traditional themes: anti-ağa and bandit films 
which have been filmed since the 60s as in Koçero (Ümit Utku, 1964) and Aç 
Kurtlar/Hungry Wolves (Yılmaz Güney, 1969).  
Although liberalization process of Turkey had begun with election in 1984, when 
Kurds are represented, the mainstream cinema avoided calling them as Kurds. Until 
the 1990s, Kurdish identity was not named but “the audience surmise that a character 
in the background who wore black shalvar, spoke bad Turkish, was poor, illiterate 
and came from the South East was a Kurd, the ignorant man from the mountains, 
devoted to his master and willing to serve him like a slave” (Dönmez-Colin, 2008: 
17). Their conditions are depicted as a result of feudalism and of their subservient 
nature, not the inadequate state policies (ibid: 91). Mainstream cinema filmed Kurds 
and their geography without giving a name and reference to authentic culture. In 
popular comedies of the time, a timeless and placeless Kurdishness is caricaturized 
through an Orientalist approach as in Kibar Feyzo (Atıf Yılmaz, 1978), Erkek Güzeli 
Sefil Bilo (Ertem Eğilmez, 1979), Şark Bülbülü (Kartal Tibet, 1979) and Davaro 
(Kartal Tibet, 1981). From the eyes of the Turkish directors, and Turkish actors, 
through exoticization and stereotyping, these ethnic comedies centralize Kurds who 
are constructed according to the dominant ideology; underdeveloped, primitive, 
vulgar, laughable, uncivilized minorities lack of certain qualification such as proper 
language and basic manners. James Morreall states that this kind of superiority 
depends on heightened self-esteem which highlights the social function of humor 
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where one gains power from mockery, ridicule and cutting someone down to size 
(1983: 4-6).  
These “fixed, clear-cut and unalterable” (Dyer, 1977: 355) stereotypes were the 
markers of un-Turkishness and still are, to some extent, in mainstream media as in 
Hemşo (Ömer Uğur, 2001) where a naïve and childish Kurdish character Cebrail 
wears shalvar and keffiyeh, speaks with a heavy accent and cherishes a vendetta 
which signifies his uncivilized character, or in the box office success Eşkiya/The 
Bandit (Yavuz Turgul, 1996). Although the central character Baran is Kurdish, the 
film is concerned about the changing values of the society, the effects of 
modernization over people. He wears shalvar and poshu, his Kurdishness is a décor 
where he is depicted as a human in the wrong times in which his understanding of 
duty and honor has lost its meaning. Not to mention these characters were passed by 
Turkish actors. Stereotyping is significant for passing because it is economical in a 
sense that “a stereotype possesses a core around which the images flow and change. 
The constancy of the central image is rarely altered and is repeated in relation to 
other aspects of the main form” (Morreal, 1987: 251). They are handy regarding 
conveying information swiftly about characters and to imbue audiences with 
expectations about actions of the characters.  
Through the 80s, 90s and 2000s, from one channel stated owned television to the age 
of internet, Turkey experienced the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic 
separatism which shook the core of Kemalism. Now the identity formations and 
feeling of belonging varies: 
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According to a 2007 survey (conducted by Tarhan Erdem), being a citizen of 
Turkey has identified first as loving Turkey (80%), then saying “I am from 
Turkey” (62%), being Muslim (55%), and being Turk (46%). As may be seen 
from this survey, while the nation state’s central republican ideology and its 
projects of modernization from above, which also involved the 
marginalization or elimination of the nation’s others, have recently lost their 
momentum and influence (Arslan, 2011: 12). 
 
Post-coup Prime Minister Turgut Özal era politics embraced minorities, thus the 
number of productions containing them increased starting from late 80s and through 
the 90s. This fact is in close relations with Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, as 
Gül Yaşartürk underlines, where Islamic, non-Muslim and Kurdish identities came 
along in cinema. In terms of non-Muslim minorities, while Rum characters led, 
Armenian characters have increased after the 90s (2012: 53). Neither Yaşartürk nor 
Dilara Balcı mention contemporary films including Jews which can be considered as 
an evidence of blanking of Jew representations. As for the ones we have, non-
Muslim representations escalate from traditional to progressive ones, but most of 
them, particularly historical ones still have usual stereotypes which are polished, yet 
remain the same such as in Rum prostitutes Madam Eleni of Ağır Roman/Cholera 
Street (Mustafa Altıoklar, 1997) and Elena of Güz Sancısı/Pains of Autumn (Tomris 
Giritlioğlu, 2009). In Pars: Kiraz Operasyonu/ Pars: Operation Cherry (Osman 
Sınav, 2007) drug smuggler is Armenian Vahe who is supported by a Kurdish 
Member of Parliament called Sami.  As mentioned before, minorities depicted as out 
of society, without roots characters through Yeşilçam. This tendency can be seen in 
films where minorities are depicted as alienated or lonely, and sometimes mentally 
and/or otherwise retarded characters such as in Sen de Gitme/ Don’t You Leave 
Either (Tunç Başaran, 1995), Güle Güle/ Bye Bye (Zeki Ökten, 2000), Gönül 
Yarası/Lovelorn (Yavuz Turgul, 2005), Eğreti Gelin/Borrowed Bride (Atıf Yılmaz, 
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2005), Sis ve Gece/ Fog and Night (Turgut Yasalar, 2007) and Kurtuluş Son 
Durak/Last Station Kurtuluş (Yavuz Pirhasan, 2012). Non-Muslim minority 
representations in above mentioned films, as Gül Yaşartürk presents, are used for 
justification of Turkish characters’ marginalization in a sense that Turkish characters 
in close relation to these minorities become others of the society. (2012: 77). 
Moreover, lonely Rum characters, particularly women, are presented as desperate 
characters in need of Turkish protection to survive as in Sen Ne Dilersen/Whatever 
You Wish (Cem Başeskioğlu, 2005) which tells a story of five unhappy and lonely 
Rum women and their relations to homeless men (ibid: 104).  
Fotoğraflar/Photographs (İrfan Tözüm, 1989) has a progressive narrative containing 
Greek dialogues, music and church images; a hint of ordinary life of Rum minorities.  
Turkish cinema comes to terms with the past in Bir Kırık Bebek/ One Broken Doll 
(Nisa Akman, 1987) and Dar Alanda Kısa Paslaşmalar/Offside (Serdar Akara, 2000) 
where honor of Armenians is restored through Armenian doll master Artin and 
football trainer Hacı, respectively.  
Today, the subject of minorities and their identities separates Turkish contemporary 
cinema into two: art house films concentrate on minorities politically and socially, 
and mainstream productions which neglect the social dynamics and prefer 
stereotypes such as in Eşkiya/Bandit (Yavuz Turgul, 1996) and Vizontele/Visiontele  
films where Kurdishness is performed by Turkish actors, except Yılmaz Erdoğan, 
and the culture is reduced to an exotic, decorative element.  
Naturally art house films create a representational space where the hegemonic 
discourse is challenged where the idea of social and cultural difference is 
emphasized. The examples, among many others, can be listed as Işıklar 
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Sönmesin/Let the Lights On (Reis Çelik, 1996) places Turkish soldier vs Kurdish 
militia, Güneşe Yolculuk (Yeşim Ustaoğlu, 1999) depicts a friendship of Turkish and 
Kurdish protagonists while criticizing prejudice towards Kurds and allows Kurdish 
language for the first time in cinema, Salkım Hanımın Taneleri/Mrs. Sakım’s 
Diamonds (Tomris Giritlioğlu, 1999) comes to terms with the infamous property tax 
of 1942 though an Armenian family tragedy in the hands of a Turkish villain, 
Bulutları Beklerken/Journey to the Sun (Yeşim Ustaoğlu, 2004) focuses on the 
deportation issue while telling a sad story about a Greek woman passed as Muslim-
Turkish for fifty years, and Büyük Adam, Küçük Aşk, aka Hejar/ Big Man, Small 
Love (Handan İpekçi, 2001) deals with restriction of Kurdish language while telling a 
story of a retired Kemalist judge and a Kurdish orphan. Throughout the 90s and 
2000s strict nationalist discourse has left its place to multiple discourses but despite 
their progressive representations, still the narratives are mostly constructed around 
problematic issues and characters who are struggling with the system as still being 
the mistreated or marginal ones.  
In midst of various representations, I follow the change in ethnicity discourse and 
analyze the patterns of passing of Kurdishness in particular cinematic eras in comedy 
genre which is chosen due to its three significant intertwined and features; 
popularity, contextuality and its unifying structure. Mahadev Apte notes that in order 
to laugh, familiarity with a cultural code is prerequisite which is not consciously 
acknowledged by the individuals since they already possess the cultural knowledge 
to enjoy the humor. An individual out of any specific culture who hasn’t internalized 
its behavioral patters and value systems may not laugh (Medhurst, 2007:12). And 
since comedy is one of the forms through which membership of a particular group 
identity can be reinforced as Henri Bergson suggests: “However spontaneous it 
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seems, laughter always implies a kind of free masonry, or even complicity, with 
other laughers, real or imaginary” (in King, 2002: 155), I will take into account 
comedy as a unifying genre through which us and otherness, as well as social 
inequality, can be constructed continuously where certain representations help this 
process. It is a known fact that comedy is often used to ridicule or mock other groups 
in society, in this sense ethnicity is one of the major grounds on which such mockery 
takes place. In order to understand this structure the next chapter will touch upon 
what comedy is, what are the main humor theories that applied to different kinds of 
jokes, and finally how ethnic jokes and comic stereotypes function in society.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A TERRAIN FOR UNITY: COMEDY 
 
“To Whom It May Concern 
I can heartily recommend the Gestapo to anyone.” 
Sigmund Freud 
 
Until now passing and identity construction issues are studied in relation to dominant 
discourse of the society, how us and others formed, how they are anchored in the 
collective memory through certain stereotypes. We saw the importance of 
representations for establishing the social unity to which laughter also contributes 
because laughter at others is one way social groups define themselves, it is “a process 
of consisting to a large extent of distinctions between self and other” (King, 2002: 
144). Evidently comedy genre has a significant contribution to these cultural 
productions and the reasons of its choice over other genres are justified below as 
Geoff King puts it: 
 
As a social product, comedy is often involved –implicitly or explicitly- in the 
politics of representations: the way one group or another is identified, 
distinguished and portrayed. Who and what we laugh at, and why 
implications in terms of both how we see ourselves and how we define 
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ourselves, the two often closely interconnected. Gender, race/ethnicity and 
nationality are there major sets of grounds on which such distinctions and 
identifications are constructed and articulated; as such, it is not surprising that 
they should be recurrent sources of comic material in film as elsewhere 
(2002: 129).  
 
Moreover, in his anthropological humor studies Mahadev Apte stresses “comedy is 
often used to ridicule and mock other groups in society, whether on gender, 
racial/ethnic or any other lines, a tendency which is widespread in human culture (in 
King, 2002: 143-144). His multidisciplinary humor studies including anthropology, 
psychology and sociology reveals that: 
 
Ethnic humor seems basic in human societies, derives from ethnocentrism, in-
group adulation, out-group resentment, prejudice, and intolerance of the 
lifestyles of others. Much of this humor is designed to combat undesired 
socio-cultural traits, such as excessive sexuality, unclearness and gluttony. 
And many times these qualities are projected onto ethnics so as to make them 
the comic butt (Lowe, 1986: 451).  
 
Konrad Lorenz, in On Aggression, draws our attention to aggressive nature of humor 
and its two functions. He offers that; “laughter produces simultaneously a strong 
fellow-feeling among participants and joint aggressiveness against outsiders […] 
Laughter forms a bond and simultaneously draws a line” (in Lowe, 1986: 440). Since 
this aggressive attitude disguised behind laughter, it becomes more dangerous and 
subversive; after all, humor can disguise hatred, contempt and any destructive 
feelings. Morreal draws our attention to the intimate relation between humor and 
aggression which reveals itself in powerful terminology containing words and 
phrases which reflect hostility in such words idiot, fool, buffoon, empty-headed, 
simpleton, thick-brained, half-brained, low-brow, dunderhead and so forth (1987: 
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255-256). Not only these words have perfect translations in Turkish, but Turkish has 
an idiosyncratic vocabulary of its own.  
Then as a contextual and unifying genre in which every ethnic script implies a 
discourse, I suggest that comedy- a very popular genre in Turkey- is a very fruitful 
terrain to study the structure regarding passing of ethnicities in regard to clarifying 
borders between us and others. The films in question, especially the Yeşilçam 
productions, were meant for this society and this society only. Keeping in mind that 
ethnic humor is a tool to maintain hegemony of the group in power, I first to draw a 
framework why we laugh, and I will briefly mention the theories of humor and then 
examine how stereotyping and passing works within comedy; a genre which is 
defined as “an invitation to belong” by Andy Medhurst (2007: 19).  
 
4.1. Theories of Humor 
While maintaining its power and success from early days to date, comedy has further 
created subgenres that are conventionally executed, such as parody, black comedy, 
political satire and comedy drama. Considering the wide spectrum of the genre, in 
order to determine how to approach comedies in general, and the films of this study 
in particular, I will draw attention to humor and major theories concerning it. 
“Humor is primarily a social phenomenon, as are other forms of human enjoyment. 
We rarely laugh when alone, even at things that would evoke our laughter if we were 
with others. […] laughing together unites people” (Morreall, 1983: 114-115). Thus 
there is a social relativity in humor and this aspect is particularly important for this 
study. As a social phenomenon, humor is a very broad field to study since it can be 
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obtained from “human misfortune and clumsiness, obscenity, grotesqueness, veiled 
insult, nonsense, wordplay and puns, human misdemeanors and so on, as manifested 
in forms as varied as parody, satire, drama, clowning, music, farce and cartoons” 
(Morreal, 1987: 139).  
Each culture has its own values, norms and rules about what is appropriated as 
humor and these determine the content, target and style of this very board field. 
Humor raises social considerations in many issues such as in the use of sexist and 
ethnic jokes. And there are various theoretical approaches are available in humor 
studies addressing different questions as Murray Davis suggests:  
 
It is fruitful to apply Hobbes’ superiority theory to aggressive jokes, 
Bergson’s mechanization theory to farce, Freud’s sexual theory to dirty jokes, 
and Northrop Frye’s anthropological theory to Aristophanic Old Comedy […] 
But humor is too complicated to be comprehended by such single-factor 
theories, no matter how well they explain one of its aspects (1993: 7). 
 
Keeping in mind the complex nature of humor, for the sake of the study I will touch 
upon the most dominant theories that are superiority, incongruity and relief to gain a 
necessary insight to construct a comprehensive discursive field to approach ethnic 
jokes and comic stereotyping. However, these theories alone do not form a general 
theory of laughter. Although these three theories are inadequate, each of them draws 
our attention to important aspects of humor. This study acknowledges that all three 
theories are indispensable and interrelated for explaining humor. As Victor Raskin 
notes, the three theories “characterize the complex phenomenon of humor from very 
different and do not at all contradict each other-rather they seem to supplement each 
other quite nicely” (in Morreal, 2009: 7).  
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4.1.1. Superiority Theory 
The oldest and probably still most widespread theory of humor suggests that laughter 
is an expression of a person's feelings of superiority over other people. This theory 
goes back to Plato, for whom the proper object of laughter is human evil. He 
suggested that the laughter leads to lose of rationality which makes people less 
human. The theory was modernized by Hobbs to whom the human race is in constant 
struggle and to him laughter is "a sudden glory arising from some conception of 
some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our 
own formerly” (Morreal, 1983:4-5). Hobbs’ notion of sudden glory was 
evolutionized by Anthony Lodovici who said “laughter is an expression of a person's 
feeling of "superior adaptation" to some specific situation, or to his environment in 
general” (ibid: 6). “The next step in the evolution of modern laughter was the 
development of ridicule. Originally people laughed at the black eye and the broken 
arm of the defeated combatant, but later they came to laugh outside of combat 
situations at any mark of injury or even deformity because these suggested that the 
person had been defeated in combat” (Morreal, 1983:7).  
Superiority depends on heightened self-esteem which highlights the social function 
of humor. It gains power from mockery, ridicule and cutting someone down to size 
and the last one contains sexual, aggressive and nonsense jokes for emotional 
release. There is feeling of superiority towards human incompetence, clumsiness, 
clowning, and misfortune. And sometimes it is a moral superiority when humor is 
born from incidents of “sex, drinking or human greed” (Morreal, 1987: 140). 
Furthermore derision is a significant part of this type of humor which sometimes can 
be cruel. Although “our moral training has removed some of it, it still comes out in 
many ways, […] as in our laughter at ethnic jokes. Even if, it is not permissible to 
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laugh at someone's misfortunes in polite company, we still enjoy witty repartee, 
especially well-phrased insults” (Morreal, 1983: 10).  
Evidently this approach can be useful to especially in analyzing ethnic and sexist 
humor since both contains hatred, hostility or aggressiveness to some extent. It is not 
adaptable to other types of laughter deriving from tickling, puns or verbal plays, 
absurd and nonsense humor. Superiority theory is important for this study because 
we laugh at persons through ridiculing them over some human features such as 
physical prowess or intelligence. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of 
humor. By nature, inanimate objects, or situations cannot be ridiculed since we can 
compare ourselves to, and so feel superior to, only other persons. Since this action 
carries a lack of respect for the ridiculed ones, in context of minority stereotypes in 
comedies, this will be the primary theory to be taken into account. 
 
4.1.2. Incongruity Theory  
“Two dog owners are having a conversation: 
-Can you imagine, my Astor goes out for the paper on his own! 
-I know, my Rex told me about it yesterday.” (Vandaele, 2002: 223)  
If we may call the emotional side of laughter lies in superiority, then cognitive side 
lies in incongruity. This time the cause of the laughter is not a feeling of triumph or 
self glory but an intellectual reaction to something that is unexpected, illogical, or 
inappropriate in some other way. The basic idea behind it is very general and simple: 
we live in an orderly world, where certain patterns are expected in orderly daily life 
and if something doesn’t fit the rule it brings laughter. (Morreal, 1983: 15-16). 
Shortly, the core concept of the theory is that human experiences work with learned 
77 
 
patterns; our experiences which prepare us for further experiences. First hinted by 
Aristotle but not elaborated as superiority theory, the theory was shaped by modern 
philosophers Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schoppenhauer (Morreal, 1987: 130). To 
Kant “in everything that is to excite a lively convulsive laugh, there must be 
something absurd. Laughter is an affection arising from the sudden transformation of 
a strained expectation into nothing” (Morreal, 1983: 16). On the other hand, 
Scoppenhauer’s theory differs from Kant in terms of relying on nothingness. To him, 
what we get in laughter situations is not nothing but frustrated expectations. Morreal 
notes that “once we have experienced something incongruous […] we no longer 
expect it to fit our mental patterns. Nonetheless, it still violates our normal 
expectations. That is how we can be amused by the same thing more than once” 
(2009:11). Eventually we get something that we were not expecting which fits into 
the situation in some way but just does not fit in the expected way.  
Then incongruity is a cognitive process which depends on a conflict between what is 
expected and what actually occurs in the joke. It relies on inconsistencies between 
circumstances and the person, thus the normative structure of the joke contains a 
surprise. In a comedy we may see different kinds of incongruities. One of them is 
linguistic incongruity which requires the most economical and fluent usage of 
language, therefore, misuse and stuttering are means of humor in any language. 
Furthermore, cognitive schemes may refer to the interaction between the signifier 
and the signified in a given language: a one-to-one correspondence is expected and 
any deviation from this creates humor in the form of puns, allusions, misuse of 
maxims, referential vagueness, lack of figurative speech, social metaphors and an 
arbitrary mixture of them which is called pragmatic incongruity (Vandaele, 2002: 
230). Also there is narrative incongruity where the film interpretation interacts with 
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pragmatic phenomena like referential vagueness; we have a logical expectation about 
a scene depending on the previous scenes but we are wronged in an unexpected way 
(ibid: 232).  
Consequently this theory cannot be applied to sentimental or ridiculing situations. It 
is a sophisticated laughter theory which is limited with intellectually constructed and 
“it is now the dominant theory of humor in philosophy and psychology” (Morreal, 
2009: 10) as in the contemporary comedies of this study. 
 
4.1.3. Relief Theory 
The last theory approaches laughter from different aspects of the phenomenon and 
concerns its biological function and physical form in relation to nervous system. 
There are different versions of this theory, but they all have in common a more or 
less physiological point of view in which laughter is seen as a venting of nervous 
energy. While the superiority theory focuses on emotions, and the incongruity theory 
on objects or ideas causing laughter, the relief theory addresses the physical and 
biological aspects. Morreal suggests that relief might fit into laughter situations in 
two ways. Firstly, “the person may have come into the situation with the nervous 
energy that is to be released, or the laughter situation itself may cause the build-up of 
the nervous energy, as well as its release” (1983: 21). Then any prohibition can build 
up an increased desire in a person to do what has been forbidden, and this frustrated 
desire may manifest itself in pent-up nervous energy. It is based on cathartic and 
abreaction purposes of humor and any taboo, such as sex, violence, alcohol, drugs, 
can be the source of relief laughter. Freud suggests that laughter releases the nervous 
tension and energy: 
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In all laughter situations we save a certain quantity of psychic energy […] is 
usually employed for psychic purpose but which turns out not to be needed. 
The discharge of this superfluous energy is laughter. In joking, he says, we 
save energy that is normally used to suppress forbidden feelings and thoughts; 
in reaction to the comic we save an expenditure of energy in thought; and in 
humor we save an expenditure of energy in emotion (Morreal, 1987: 131).  
 
Jokes or events about sexuality, violence, and racism may be considered in this 
category. According to this theory restrictions cause people to suppress their sexual 
desires, when a taboo is broken and sexual jokes are made, forbidden sexual thoughts 
are called up and some of the repressed sexual energy is released in laughter which 
happens in Yeşilçam comedies of this study frequently talks about sex and sexual 
intercourse.  
Clearly there is a connection between at least some laughter and the relief of tension 
or the expenditure of energy. But not every comic situation releases excessive energy 
such as word plays and puns. And certainly not in every situation people have a 
hidden agenda relying on forbidden thoughts and feelings. But we cannot deny that 
after surviving a great deal of danger many people laugh very heartily, and get rid of 
this excessive energy where laughter works in a cathartic way. This feature of 
laughter will be taken into account while studying taboo issues of the society. 
  
4.2. Ethnic Jokes and Comic Stereotypes 
“-Everybody thinks we are terrorists,” complains an Arab shopkeeper. 
“-You think that's bad?” replies a Jew. “Everyone thinks we are you!” 
You Don’t Mass with the Zohan (Dennis Dogan, 2008) 
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Consumption of media texts, films particularly, takes place in cultural contexts and 
comedy, biography and history are considered typical high-context genres (Volz et. 
al., 2010: 134). The themes, plots, values, ideas, expressions and ideology that films 
convey are embedded or presented through the cultures from which they are 
flourished. Therefore, in these genres identifying with the style, values and 
behavioral patterns of the material is very crucial. Out of the three, comedy by nature 
can be applied to any object in film therefore, in cinema; it has a wide range of forms 
from slapstick to grotesque, from satire to romantic comedies.  
Fundamentally comedy “concentrates on the incongruities of human beings, 
especially their short comings. From its earlier days it has highlighted human 
ugliness, ignorance, folly and vice; and its stock characters have been the hunchback, 
the fool, the wind-bag, the drunkard, the imposter, the hypocrite and so forth” 
(Morreall, 1999:14). Some of the traditional characters have changed or evolved, 
though, the purpose remained; to-be laughed-at-ness through physical appearance or 
socially repressed behaviors. Not limited to, but highly appraised profane, vulgar and 
obscene films such as There is Something About Mary (Bobby & Peter Farrelly, 
1998), series of American Pie (1999-2003), series of Hangover (2009-2014), and 
Jackass series (2000-2013), far more than the others, not only use body vulgarly, 
disregard the social rules but also make use of human abject such as saliva, vomit or 
semen for the sake of comedy. This type rude and to some extent crude comedy 
involves comic elements like pushing the limits of stupidity, grotesque body and 
numerous kinds of irrationality is also very popular in Turkish cinema where comedy 
is among the most profit making genres whose spectators are not gendered like 
melodrama or pornography.  
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Comedy is a relatively inexpensive cinematic form which can generate high profit 
with low costs and humor based on obscene language, slang, lack of manners, 
barbarity and thick accent are commonly used by Turkish mainstream to draw the 
masses. Turkey box office success of all times reveals this particular fact. Out of the 
top ten of all times most watched films, seven of them are comedies; the first in the 
list is Recep İvedik 4(Şahan Gökbakar, 2014), followed by Düğün Dernek/Merry 
Making (Selçuk Aydemir, 2013), fourth is Recep İvedik 2 (Şahan Gökbakar, 2009, 
fifth is Recep İvedik (Şahan Gökbakar, 2008), seventh is GORA (Ömer Faruk Sorak, 
2004), eight is Eyvah Eyvah 2 (Hakan Algül, 2011), and the ninth is CM101MMXI 
Fundamentals (Murat Dündar, 2013). (http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/hollywood_ 
komediden_umudu_kesti_bizde_tam_tersi-1200755).  Recep İvedik films are perfect 
example of rude and crude comedies where laughter derives from excessiveness and 
misbehavior. These films not only gained immense success at box office but also 
quickly became a phenomenon in cultural sphere.  
In 2013 and in the first six months of 2014 the figures are six and five, respectively. 
Considering the DVD sales, internet viewings and television broadcasting, the 
prevalence of the genre goes beyond this measurable box office success which 
makes comedy a powerful genre to disseminate certain ideologies since, media 
images are referred in everyday conversations where “privileged ideological 
discourse is socially validated” (Lull, 1995: 20). Therefore, despite commonly 
treated as safe and unthreatening the power of comedy should not be underestimated. 
When ethnic representations are taken into account the significance of comedies 
reveal itself. Because under uneven conditions, derived from the structural 
inequalities of the society, mocking and ridiculing others contribute to the 
legitimation to dominance of power. Previously minority representations and 
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stereotypes in Turkish cinema were discussed in general now the study will 
concentrate on comic ethnic stereotypes and underline how they don’t differ much 
from the resentful, hateful or humiliating ones.  
Morreal notes that telling and enjoying sexist and racist jokes rely on certain 
emotional attitudes in a society (1987: 226). Similarly, Michael Billig states that 
humor is not so far from hatred and adds that unambiguous stereotypes of gender or 
ethnicity demand a suspension of empathy with the target being an object of ridicule 
(2001: 268). Therefore, ethnic jokes and stereotyping is a good signifier of the 
subconscious of a society or the collective thinking of the majority. The most 
common ethnic jokes and stereotypes are about stupidity, laziness, sexual immorality 
and some other shortcomings where “the other is seen as laughably foolish and 
incompetent, and so not capable of taking on greater power or responsibility” (King, 
2002: 144) which reproduces the dominant discourse regarding social hierarchy 
through laughter as in Yeşilçam comedies. 
As mentioned before humor unites and draws boundaries. Anthropologist Christie 
Davies notes that ethnic jokes “delineate the social, geographic and moral boundaries 
of a nation or ethnic group. By making fun of peripheral and ambiguous groups they 
reduce ambiguity and clarify boundaries or at least make ambiguity appear less 
threatening” (1982: 383). Ethnic jokes play an important role in group identity 
formation and solidarity. She studied thousands of jokes around the world and found 
out that ethnic jokes reflect the competing moral values, uncertain social boundaries 
and impersonal power structures of the societies. Moreover, jokes about cowardice 
and other shortcomings attributed to ethnic groups are found in numerous countries 
with the same social pattern. Thus, although it is unifying, humor can be 
simultaneously social and antisocial, bringing some individuals together while 
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fostering division among others. Any minority can’t be expected to laugh at 
themselves through ridiculing stereotypes as the majority does.  
In many cases although the ethnic joke tellers don’t imply or assert that certain 
groups are inferior in any ways, they are still responsible and guilty to some extent 
by telling the jokes and being indifferent and not caring about the harm that may 
derive from circulating these jokes. Morreal notes that these jokes should be 
considered as harmful because “they present characters with exaggerated degrees of 
undesirable traits who represent groups that some people believe actually have those 
traits.” Jokes about stupid Polish, dishonest Greek, coward Italian, stingy Jew, pedant 
Armanian etc are based on “stretching negative stereotypes” with exaggerated degree 
of shortcomings. These exaggerations “convert morally objectionable ideas into 
palpable ones”. As mentioned before Turkish cinema creates comic stereotypes of 
certain minorities; Armenians and Kurds. However, it is a significant fact that comic 
stereotypes are not more innocent than the hostile ones. Framing stereotypes with a 
playful tone makes the jokes enjoyable rather than hostile. However this playfulness 
lets prejudice slip smoothly into people’s minds without being given a second 
thought as in 2006 made comedy Borat: The Cultural Learnings of America for 
Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan (Larry Charles) in which Kazakhs were 
represented as racist, anti-Semitic, crude and Gypsy hating people. Consequently 
Kazakh government released an advertisement in New York Times for their 
resentment of the stereotype created in the film which has nothing to do with real life 
Kazakhs. (Morreal, 2009: 98-108). Thus even if the majority enjoys, there is always 
a potential to offend lies underneath the many types of humor including the one 
derives from ethnic jokes. Watching clumsy, naïve and sometimes foolish French 
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Inspector Jacques Clouseau in The Pink Panther (Blake Edwards, 1963) has different 
affects on English and French audience.  
It is obvious that this kind of stereotypical jokes treats the people of target group as 
inferior and interchangeable with certain shortcomings. The shortcomings of the 
minorities are also used by Yeşilçam such as lack of proper Turkish spoken by Rum, 
Jews and Armenians of İstanbul. In the context of Kurdishness these shortcomings 
have a longer list from manners to language, from dressing to life style. 
Consequently, when Kurdishness is passed by a Turkish actor, the shortcomings 
become more significant because we acknowledge the actor in his real identity and 
make distinctions about ethnic innuendos easily. While discussing whites passing as 
Asians Kent Ono and Vincent Pham state that any “form of racial masquerade” in 
which the audience is aware of the actor’s original racial identity “allows the 
audience to play around with race- to imagine what aspects of race is align with an 
imagined while simultaneously attempting to note aspects of the actor’s whiteness, 
thus practicing the skills of discriminating” between what is white and what is not 
(2009: 47). I suggest that the implication is also true for affirmation of Turkishness; 
moreover, since the audience knows they are Turkish actors, they feel safe to laugh 
at them from a distance. 
Stereotyping in comedy has significance because they help to establish instantly 
recognizable character types from which stereotype based jokes born as a source of 
humor. Moreover, stereotyping serves an ideological function that to legitimate the 
social hierarchy through normalizing racially/ethnically defined characteristics 
(King, 2002). Jane Feuer argues that ‘‘the genre positions the interpretive community 
in such a way as to naturalize the dominant ideologies expressed in the text’’ (quoted 
in Park et. al, 2006:145). Thus, ideological implications of these stereotypes gain 
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significance in a social environment in which ethnic prejudice, resentment and/or 
hatred is rooted such as Turkey where ethnic jokes and stereotypes inevitably 
reinforce the ongoing hierarchy.  
In his discussion of 48 Hours (Walter Hill, 1982) Donald Bogle claims that although 
comedy has a potential to “comment on the problematic nature of stereotyping, it 
rarely capitalizes the opportunity […] since minority characters rarely resist or reject 
the stereotypes that are forced upon them” (ibid: 159). 48 Hours is a valid example to 
prove the idea since Reggie Hammond (Eddie Murphy) never gets mad at Jack Cates 
(Nick Nolte) for making racially insulting comments, thus ‘‘greatly neutralizes the 
inherent racism’’ (quoted in Park et. al, 2006: 159). Moreover, since comedy is 
considered as a light genre, “theories of genre suggest that the naturalization of racial 
difference through stereotyping is more likely to occur in a comedic format because 
generic conventions discourage viewers’ critical engagement with the racial 
discourse” (Park et. al, 2006: 160) 
In Yeşilçam comedies stereotypes “gain power by repetitive play” so that the image 
becomes part of a collective memory and ridiculing and mocking in comedies 
“becomes pernicious where it is used to reinforce inequalities” (King, 2002: 144). I 
had mentioned before that stereotypes become living entities and they eventually 
leak into the collective memory and social domain. The danger of negative 
stereotyping is, as Morreal notes, “mere repeated thinking of groups in negative 
stereotypes is enough to prompt us to treat real individuals not according to their 
merits and shortcomings […], but as automatically inferior because they belong to 
those groups” (2009: 108). Furthermore, Geoff King points out the possible harmful 
effects of minority actors’ passing as their own racial/ethnical stereotypes. Giving 
example of enactment of racist stereotypes such as the ‘coon- a stereotype based on 
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an black adult who is lazy, perpetually frightened, idiotic and childish-’ by Black 
comedians such as Eddie Murphy, Martin Lawrence, and Chris Tucker, he suggests 
that their performances are uncomfortably reminiscent of racist ideologies that have 
been used to justify racial discrimination discourses of the past (2002: 145). His 
assertion is a valid one considering most of the audience welcomes negative 
stereotypes of the minorities; they are taken for granted most of the time, without 
criticizing or even thinking.  
Comic or not, stereotypes are “tenacious in its hold over rational thinking” and they 
“pervade the deepest sense and profoundly affect behavioral actions” (Morreal, 
1987:250). When audience laughs at humor derived from ethnic jokes or acts, they 
validate the stereotypes embedded within. Charles Husband underlines, in ethnic 
humor discussion, one should always remember that a joke is never “just a joke” (in 
Billig, 2001, 269), and this study will take this fact into consideration and not forget 
that defending ethnic humor may in fact validate negative stereotypes in society. In 
Turkish cinema, given ethnic stereotypes are most frequently used to represent 
minorities, the imposed rigid ethnic beliefs help maintaining the social hierarchy, 
implicitly affirm Turkishness and confirm its privileged stance. And I believe that 
ethnic stereotypes in comedy should be taken seriously because of their potential to 
naturalize the differences through humor. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
PASSING KURDISHNESS IN TURKISH COMEDIES 
 
 
5.1. Methodology 
The theoretical framework for this study is articulated within the field of discourse 
analysis that examines the structures and functions of the textual and visual 
components in their social, political and cultural contexts. Therefore, Kurdishness 
will be discussed as a discourse, which has changed historically, and will be analyzed 
through passing practices in cinema. Kurdishness only meaningfully exist within the 
discourse about them, it also exists through certain discourse which gives us a kind 
of knowledge about it. Thus, the films will reveal this state of knowledge (episteme) 
sharing the same style to support a strategy and pattern. Furthermore, at a particular 
historical moment the discourse provides us certain ways of talking and excludes 
other ways about the given topic like the films of the late 70s and early 80s. The 
subjects of the discourse, the Kurds, are only to be known through the knowledge 
which was constructed at that time. This knowledge is produced by an authority, 
namely Yeşilçam, the mainstream cinema, constitutes the truth about the matter for 
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an historical moment. Since stereotyping occurs in the realm of power, it can be an 
example of Foucauldian power/knowledge relation where people are classified 
according to a norm, constructed and excluded as other. These stereotypes have 
changed and a different discourse had born with new conceptions about Kurdishness 
as will be seen the latter comedy films.  
According to Foucault, “in each period, discourse produced forms of knowledge, 
objects, subjects, and practices of knowledge, which differed radically from period to 
period, with no necessary continuity between them” (quoted in Hall, 1997: 46) which 
also explains the changing Kurdishness discourse in the films. It is evident that the 
production of the latter group films were realized when the power relations in the 
society shifted and cultural sphere allowed different narratives.  
To this end, ethnic elements of tradition, people-hood, religion, language, values, and 
aesthetics, or I may say ethnic features that are attributed to them, will be looked for 
in construction of Kurdishness. Since the core of the ethnic group is their codes and 
values; overt signals of food, dress, and language, and basic value orientations of 
standards of morality and excellence, the analysis will focus on them as markers of 
identity. In other words, labels of Kurdishness in behaving, talking, clothing, body 
language, gestures, and some other physical attributes will be analyzed through 
different discourses to reveal the passing codes of the films. 
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5.2. Rural Comedies in General 
The ethnification of comedy was a well-established trend during the last years of 
Yeşilçam where films were made about minorities casting majorities for two main 
reasons: the issues regarding production and distribution (the cast is formed by well 
known Turkish comedy actors) and Turkish audience identify easily with Turkish 
actors. The films in this study depict lives of the Kurds living in rural East, the most 
underdeveloped region in the country, where the Kurdish community is predominant. 
The interest towards the region can be inscribed through “nostalgia and nationalism, 
which caters to a gap between modernity and tradition” (ibid, 2011: 254). Furthermore 
there is a distinction among urban and rural comedies that the first type comedy of 
manners depends on topicality offering an alert critique of metropolitan society at a 
particular place and time, whereas in rural comedy of manners “the fun lies in 
recalling or inferring the rules of a remote, outdated or a vanished world” (Nelson, 
1990: 36). Then from the beginning we may suggest that we are looking at an 
outdated, primitive and backward world of the Kurds where characters would be 
unsophisticated. Although shot during the late 70s and early 80s, before the 
transformation of the country, there is no time reference in first group comedies.  
Although first era films were not shot in the region, they give the impression of the 
region though mountains and badlands. Yeşilçam depicted villages in melodramatic, 
realistic or Kemalist terms. The first is about clash between good and bad, the second 
depends on social reality of rural life and the last one focuses on the ideological war 
of the state men such as teachers, doctors, soldiers against traditionalist and 
reactionaries (Arslan, 2011: 211). The studied Yeşilçam era comedies can be 
considered melodramatic since there is always a battle between the feudal landlord 
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Ağa and the peasants however; it also underlines the gap between civilized West and 
uncivilized East which is depicted as backward, uneducated and primitive. 
  
5.3. Yeşilçam Era Comedies 
Comedy is a matter of conflicts as well as pleasure, literary critic James English 
notes and describes comedy as: 
 
Comic practice is always on some level or in some measure an assertion of 
group against group, an effect and event of struggle, a form of symbolic 
violence. The inescapable heterogeneity of society, the ceaseless conflict of 
social life, the multiple and irreconcilable patterns of identification within 
which relationships of hierarchy and solidarity must be negotiated- these are 
what our laughter is ‘about’ (quoted Medhurst, 2007: 14).  
 
What English suggests for comedies is very accurate for Yeşilçam films since 
Turkishness was imposed as a norm of the “good” moral values against minorities. 
Therefore, it is not a coincidence that all the comedies from classical era depict 
Kurds sex driven individuals. “Freud sees the lower bodily stratum repressed for the 
advance of civilization” (Horton, 1991: 113), and it is not a surprise that none of 
Kurdish characters’ explicit talk about sex and continuous acts of vocal sexual 
implications can be seen in Turkish characters. What Frantz Fanon suggests for 
blackness in mainstream cinema is applicable to some extent to these films: “The 
Negro represents the sexual instinct in its raw state. The Negro is the incarnation of 
genital potency beyond all moralities and prohibitions” (Foster, 2003: 37). I am not 
suggesting that over sexed black representations share the same historical and 
cultural reasons with Kurds, however I suggest that sex, which was denied by the 
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norm of Turkishness, was used by cinema as one of the tools to differentiate Kurds 
from Turks.  
Another tool is the constant emphasize on how Kurds haven’t been able to develop a 
civilized way of life in their original territory namely East and South East Anatolia. 
This part of the country is depicted as uncivilized regardless the fact of lack of state 
and the underdeveloped discourse is structured upon binary oppositions of civilized 
west and uncivilized east. Stuart Hall claims rightfully that blacks are associated with 
“open expression of emotion and feeling rather than intellect, a lack of civilized 
refinement in sexual and social life, a reliance on custom and ritual, and the lack of 
developed civil institutions, all of which are linked to Nature” (1997a: 243). When 
Yeşilçam comedies are taken into account this assessment fits the followed pattern in 
the films, Kurds are depicted as less civilized, lazy, primitive to some extent and 
childish characters live under the authority of the Ağa whereas Turks are depicted 
within urban settings associated with culture. Moreover, the films impose limitations 
upon Kurds in terms of social, economical and geographical mobility. Although 
Kurdish urban immigration had begun, these films capture a timeless Kurdish life set 
in East Anatolia in a rural setting as if implying their infinite place.  
Another common feature of these films is their concern in sexual intercourse and 
marriage. Andrew Horton states that romance requires personal compromise and 
social integration, as traditionally represented in the final marriage. Such comedy is 
therefore Oedipal and exists in the realm of the symbolic as opposed to that of the 
imaginary. The characters, no matter how much they have turned the everyday world 
upside down during the narrative, must act like "adults" to the degree of committing 
themselves to each other and thus to life within society. They change; society 
remains the same. They may have had their flings and fantasies and acted them out 
92 
 
but in the end, order is restored, and the rules of society are maintained. No matter 
how nutty or carried away the characters become, commitment to heterosexual 
partnerships ultimately means that some Oedipal resolution must emerge (1991: 11). 
Thus, although they live on the border of the society, they are interiorized through 
patriarchal adjustments. 
Moreover these films are based on familiar ethnic stereotypes and linguistic humor 
depending on malapropisms, double entendres, and accent play which include 
exaggerations. According to Allon White: 
 
Our cultural categories of seriousness and triviality are profoundly intertwined 
with questions of social power, and those categories are questions are often 
played out in terms of different forms of language. Certain ways of speaking 
indicate particular points in the social hierarchy, so that comic characters in 
many Shakespeare ‘s plays speak in prose, often use regional dialect and come 
from the lower social classes, whereas tragic characters speak in poetry, use 
dominant forms of language and come from higher social echelons (quoted in 
Medhurts, 2007: 16).  
 
The films use language as an indicator of social hierarchy where Turkish characters 
of law, military or state speak fluent Turkish and dictate dominance through high 
language and seriousness. Although few, when appear all Turkish characters 
represent, one way or another, state and maintain “Turkish authority” and social 
power with language. White argues that seriousness is a matter of power than content 
thus the authority designates what should be taken seriously in a way of maintaining 
and creating power. (ibid: 16). These comedies implicitly urge the audience, as well 
as the Kurds, to take state seriously. This approach is closely related with the social 
and political sphere of the country during the 70s and the early 80s when the country 
was divided into two halves: left and right.  
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Before Kurdish movement, Kurds were placed on the left wing of the political 
agenda, their identities were determined not by Kurdishness but by their political 
stand. During the 70s Turkish state was struggling on many fronts: economical crisis, 
rapid urban migration, social upheaval and unrest, foreign crisis. And these Yeşilçam 
comedies were meant to bring joy to a country which was always on the verge of a 
breakdown. Furthermore, these films were produced before the attacks of the PKK 
which were responded with military intervention. Hence, the image of the Kurds as 
minorities was not associated with terrorism and separatism. Kurdish issue as it is 
today didn’t exist back then since the division in the country was based on orthodox 
political stands. The known Kurds to urban population mostly were the ones 
immigrated and work at low class jobs. They were associated with ignorance and 
underdevelopment. Yeşilçam films were made under these social, political and 
cultural conditions. There is no self-determination and control over Kurdishness by 
Kurds but an imposition by the majority to stuck them in certain geography.  
Now the films in question will be analyzed in light of the above mentioned patterns 
and codes of ethnic passing which depict Kurds as “more Kurds” and as much as 
possible “less Turks”; a strategy naturalizes presumed ethnic differences, underlines 
the superiority of Turkishness through lack of manners, language and culture. Last 
word before the analysis; I had mentioned a child song about a village far away, it is 
the village in these films that is too far that we never visit but claim to be ours with 
nameless people that, in fact, we know so little about.  
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5.3.1. Salako/Stupid(o)(1974) 
Directed by one of Yeşilçam’s most widely acclaimed directors, also producer, Atıf 
Yılmaz, it is the first of the Kurdish village comedies which can be considered as the 
weakest link in terms of narrative and characterization. The environmental settings 
are enough to imply a Kurdish rural life; not a civilized one. It is a parody of 
traditional Kurdish bandit films like previously mentioned Koçero. Allegedly set in 
Eastern Anatolia, the film tells a story of a highly childish and stupid character Salo 
(Kemal Sunal) who is called as salako referring to his lack of intelligence. The last 
letter is tagged to the original word salak/stupid to refer Kurdishness which is a 
strategy followed in the following films such as in names Feyzo, Gülo, Bilo and 
Maho. Salo reminds the traditional black stereotype of Sambo a happy, irresponsible 
or carefree character who is naturally lazy and docile, therefore reliant upon his 
master for direction. The film mocks Kurdish bandits and feudal system mainly 
through Salo character. The humor derives mainly from Salo’s excessive stupidity, 
clumsiness and repeated sexual demands where these actions at the same time define 
Kurdishness. There is an ongoing emphasize on sexual intercourse supposed to 
happen on the wedding night which eventually happens at the end of the film in a 
cave like environment without a wedlock, a very inconvenient situation for the 
mainstream comedies. The film lacks of the heavy Kurdish accent acknowledged by 
the following films, instead the villagers talk in Central Anatolia accent and only the 
bandits are depicted in traditional outwear. While mocking the bandits living on the 
mountains and drawing attention to Ağa-bandit collaboration as the reasons of the 
uncivilized and backward life, the film caricaturizes Kurds who are either bandit or 
servants; either living in a village owned by an ağa who exploits his subjects or 
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becoming a bandit and rob mostly your own people. This is the life of a Kurd which 
is more or less repeated in the following films. 
  
5.3.2. Kibar Feyzo/Polite Feyzo (1978) 
Although shot in Reyhanlı, Hatay, Atıf Yılmaz directed film is set in an Eastern 
Kurdish village with badlands without crop. The storyline is simple: after military 
service two young Kurdish men Feyzo (Kemal Sunal) and Bilo (İlyas Salman) return 
to their village with will to marry to the same girl Gülo (Müjde Ar), but there is a 
problem of collecting bride price. Thus the story revolves around this particular 
problem and the protagonist Feyzo - who is exiled many times by Ağa (Şener Şen)- 
tries to raise the money through working various jobs in İstanbul from porterage to 
manual labor which are considered as traditional Kurdish jobs to be handled by 
villagers. Unlike Salako, the use of language, the accent and outfit of the villagers are 
consistent in this film. Again the vulgar language, slang (characters call each other as 
hırbo and kıro) and swearing, oversexed driven characters, the tension of first night 
of the wedding which happened by the road in the bushes, and repeated references to 
sexual encounter are the main source of comedy.  
The lack of proper set decoration reference to Kurdish culture and the usage of 
Turkish folk songs sung with proper Turkish by Hatay Community Center Folklore 
Group are the remainders of a film which is produced by a hegemonic point of view. 
The supposedly cultural elements are selected in the film for exaggeration and vital 
elements of culture are neglected such as food or festivities. Considering the ban on 
Kurdish songs, and as Müslüm Yücel states most of, if not all, Kurdish songs are 
compiled as Turkish starting from 1926 to 1976 (2008: 20), it is an inevitable choice 
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to use Turkish or complied songs in the films.  But the remarkable fact is that the 
songs are sung in proper Turkish as if cleansing the folkloric realm and cultural 
production from Kurds. Turks appear on the screen thorough serious characters 
representing the state as gendarmes and judge, or urban civilized citizens with proper 
language and manners; who don’t collect bride price, use public toilet and who are 
after their rights through worker unions. To be brief, urban Turks know the best and 
teach these matters of facts to Kurdish characters as in one of İstanbul scenes where a 
fedora wearing urban Turkish citizen tells Feyzo who was about to take a leak by the 
side of a building; “This is not a mountain top, learn some civilization.” As discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter language is used as an indicator of social hierarchy 
where Turkish characters of law, military, state dictate dominance through high 
language. The film ends with Feyzo’s killing the tyranniser Ağa who refused every 
single change in order not to lose his power. While doing so he was assisted by 
Feyzo’s foe Bilo, a very vigilant character. Inevitably poor Feyzo goes to jail and it is 
told that new Ağa is worse than the deceased one. The film often underlines that 
Kurds had long forgotten to look after their own rights and crushed by the power of 
Ağa, yet no reference is attributed to state’s role in the backwardness of the region. 
And the film finishes with a line from Feyzo; “Who is to blame?” where every arrow 
direct feudalism and the people who are like Bilo or passive villagers. 
 
5.3.3. Erkek Güzeli Sefil Bilo/Man Beauty Miserable Bilo (1979) 
Directed by another one of Yeşilçam’s most known directors, producer and scenarist 
Ertem Eğilmez, the film again is set in an Eastern Kurdish village, this time 
protagonist Bilo (İlyas Salman) tries to get married to the Cano (Sevda Aktolga) who 
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is the daughter of his father’s murderer. The film revolves around the problem of 
vendetta and how it is manipulated by Maho Ağa (Şener Şen) who is after the same 
girl. Bilo is a very lazy, rather stupid, manipulated, unemployed and a childish 
character that steals apple from trees or wanders around. He is a very similar 
character to Salo of the first film which also has strong resemblances with previously 
mentioned Sambo stereotype.  
When Bilo is forced by Ağa and the villagers for vendetta, he refuses to do so and 
exiled from the village by Ağa, and then with the help of two old bandits, one of 
them is called Şivan- a Kurdish name means shepherd in Turkish- he passes on to 
bandit life in the mountains. While he hi-jacks and earns his reputation as a bandit, 
the state decides upon a land reform where Ağa owned land be transferred to 
villagers for free. The decision is declared by the voice of the state; gendarme and 
state officials. This proposal is accepted by the villagers reluctantly. In byplay, Bilo 
abducts Cano and rapes her in her sleep, which is implied but not shown, to force her 
into marriage. Again the oversexed characters and vulgar language are the 
determinant factors of the culture. While getting famous and rich, Bilo cooperates 
with Ağa and he forces villagers to give back their registered land to Ağa. However, 
when Bilo understands he is deceived by Ağa, he kills him and goes to prison. This 
time we are left with an unspoken question: Who is to blame? To be frank, it is a 
tricky question to answer.  
Through the narrative we see that an oppressive and manipulative Ağa who rules as 
he wishes until state launches a land reform which takes most of his power. The 
intervention of the state is welcomed reluctantly since Kurdish villagers seem 
confused with what to do with the land. Then Ağa requests from bandit Bilo to take 
the land back which he complies and forces his own villagers to feudal slavery which 
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was recently came to a halt thanks to the state. The bandit character turns out to be an 
enemy for his own people similar to Ağa. Moreover, at the end, Cano promises her 
eternal love to her rapist and abductor Bilo which makes the audience ask whether 
these people are too naive or forgiving. When Bilo kills the Ağa he declares; “You 
are our main enemy”, but it seems to be too little and too late. But eventually the 
blame is put on Ağa and the feudal system which is carried on thanks to Kurds who 
didn’t follow the authority which bestowed land to them. At the end, similar to its 
precessors, the narrative is formed around village-mountain-jail triangle for Kurdish 
men, and being a property, not only to ağa but also to men in their lives, for Kurdish 
women. 
  
5.3.4. Şark Bülbülü/Mockingbird of the East (1979) 
Directed by an important figure of Yeşilçam actor, scenarist and director Kartal 
Tibet, the film is different from its precessors; it is set both in rural East and İstanbul. 
As a sign of the increasing immigration to big cities, especially İstanbul, the film 
revolves around the classical themes of bride price and ağa oppression, yet it also is 
a parody of life of well known Kurdish singer/actor İbrahim Tatlıses who emigrated 
to İstanbul from a village of Urfa with nothing, and became a huge success. The 
surname of the protagonist is Ballıses, an open allegory to the singer’s. The film 
begins with Şaban Ballıses (Kemal Sunal), the village guard, taking bribe to collect 
bride price. The village is sold for five million liras to a new ağa since the previous 
one has decided emigrate to İstanbul. Not only cows and sheep, but also women, men 
and children are priced during the sale. When new Ağa Zülfo (Sırrı Elitaş) wants to 
take Şaban’s fiancé as a co-wife, Şaban is exiled from the village. Thus, half of the 
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film is set in İstanbul where he rapidly becomes a celebrity. While becoming so, his 
misfit to urban manners is mocked in many scenes like where he wears white 
underwear to a women filled swimming pool where he is called as “wild man”. 
İstanbul scenes work in two layers; rising of his accidentally began singing career 
where he also becomes a film and television star and his misfit to the urban living 
and manners. At the end, after involving with the mafia unknowingly, he is also 
troubled with the Ağa who wants him dead. After running from an assassination 
attempt he comes back to his village whose debt is paid by him. This time the Ağa 
dies from a possible heart attack and quite accidentally where villagers commit to 
development of the village. Unlike the real life celebrity who is also is a 
businessman; Şaban chooses the simple life of the village and leaves İstanbul for 
good. Once again the evil ağa is killed for better futures, among all this is the most 
optimist film where collective development is aimed in the absence of a feudal 
system.  
 
5.3.5. Davaro (1981)  
Last of the classical era comedies Davaro, directed by Kartal Tibet, revolves around 
the same themes of vendetta and bride price, furthermore like the previous film it is 
set in the East and İstanbul. This time Memo/Davaro (Kemal Sunal) comes back 
from Germany after collecting bride price for Cano (Pembe Mutlu), however, he is 
required by his mother to kill Sülo/Hıyarto (Şener Şen) for vendetta before marriage. 
When outcasted by the villagers, he cooperates with Sülo in execution of a false 
killing. However, they find themselves in the mountain with bandits from whom they 
steal and immediately run to İstanbul where Sülo deceives Memo and runs with the 
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money. At the end they are back to village, pay villagers debt to Ağa, and Memo and 
Cano run to the mountains.  
The lack of sex and wish to fulfill it is a strong component of the story along with the 
bandit life wherein protagonists hi-jack busses with passengers in western-modern 
apparels where bandits are decorated with vests full of bullets and heavy guns. When 
in jail, Memo sings two songs with dubbed proper Turkish similar to the practice in 
Polite Feyzo. The voice of power floats through songs and Turkish characters mainly 
wardens and gendarme. When Sülo is caught on blowing the stolen money on 
indulgent life they return the village. The story is wrapped around the same themes 
of the precessors but it also involves an urban small time crook story which draws 
attention to fail in city life due to misfit. At the end Memo threatens to kill the Ağa if 
he bothers the villagers where he leaves for the mountains with his wife and a 
weapon in hand. Like in the Mockingbird of the East, the pattern of returning to the 
village, not hanging on the urban life, and being a misfit is repeated here as an 
indicator underlying the place of the Kurds. Because, unlike Polite Feyzo where city 
was a temporary place to work and collect money to marry, in the last two films the 
protagonists tend to stay, but fail eventually. The films can be considered as 
geographically closed which tend to capture Kurds in a specific region.  
As its precessors, the film is lack of indicators of Kurds traditions such as food, 
music, festivities, and concentrates on bandit life, vendetta and bride price as cultural 
signifiers. These caricaturized images naturalize and normalize the ethnic differences 
where disadvantages and limitations of social, economic and geographical aspects 
are ignored. 
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5.4. Contemporary Comedies 
The following films are made two decades after the first group after having seen 
enormous changes that shook the core of the society. The country had passed through 
an era of violence and polarization where Kurdishness discourse has changed. People 
living on the border came into existence with political demands. During these years 
Turkey gained new concepts such as Kurdish issue, Kurdish language, names and 
identity, and acknowledged the fact of a de facto independent Kurdish Regional 
Administration established in Northern Iraq after the First Gulf War in 1991. Thus 
the understanding of Kurdishness was changed fundamentally and when 2000s came, 
urban Kurds had increased considerably where they gained visibility. The beginning 
of the 2000s may be called an era of consensus where military approach was changed 
for democratization. The following films were made during a relatively peaceful 
period of Turkey; however, their stories are set in 1974 and 1980. Thus the facts and 
events of the 70s are the main concern of the both film which were box office 
successes. Since their creator Yılmaz Erdoğan suggests these films about Kurdish 
problem, in their own way, now I will examine Kurdishness, or lack of it, in light of 
the social changes to underline how small the change has been in minority discourse, 
and Kurdishness in particular, in mainstream cinema. These provincial films will be 
discussed from a perspective of an idealized representation of the 70s from the point 
view of the 2000s.  
With the born of the new Turkish cinema during the mid-1990s, new directors 
stepped in the scene, Asuman Suner states. Among them some tend to make lyrical 
provincial life films which contain an idealized representation of 70s. This tendency, 
according to Suner, derives from, but not limited to, the need to make a critique of 
the transformation of Turkish society over the past decades which shook the core of 
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notions of homeland, sense of belonging and identity. In this framework, Vizontele, 
Dar Alanda Kısa Paslaşmalar/Offside and O da Beni Seviyor/Summer Love have 
recurring thematic trope about anxieties and yearnings through a “nostalgia for an 
imaginary past, an idealized representation of the 70[with] striking thematic, generic 
and visual resemblances” (2002: 61-62). In the light of her argument, I will analyze 
the new set of film using her “provincial small town life” trope. The subject of this 
study Vizontele Tuuba was released two years after the article but as a sequel it has 
all the characteristics the others share regarding small town life; a new kind of rural 
film depending on subjective account of memory which remakes the past from 
present. Consequently this nostalgic approach rewrites history and collective 
memory. In short, leaving the truth Gevaş is a real town in physical senses, it is as 
real as the villages of Yeşilçam which capture the lives of the Kurds; imaginary 
villages of Yeşilçam left their place to an imaginary historical sense idealizing the 
70s small town life from the viewpoint of 2000s. Then, in these films, imaginary 
meets the real life to represent a dreamlike past that is before all the negative events 
of the upcoming decade. In both of the following films, there is a clear “fabrication 
of a feeling of “past-ness” through visual elements, particularly setting and costume 
[however] the mannerisms and dialogue of the characters clearly belong to 
contemporary, arguably metropolitan, Turkish society” (Suner, 2002: 65) which 
explains the sense of incongruous humor of the present day. These people, as Suner 
suggests, acknowledge the fact of their limited and close life, feel its melancholia 
and, when necessary, make fun of themselves through a modern consciousness 
(2006: 56). 
As well as the ill incidents Turkey lived in late 70s and early 80s, as Suner puts, 
Turkey also has undergone a big transformation in terms of economy, global 
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integration, minority rights and civil society. While having legal, economic and 
technological reforms, Turkey faced different problems such as income gap and 
social polarization. (2002: 72). In the midst of the social and economic problems 
Turkey struggled with Kurdish separatists which certainly had a direct effect on 
Kurdishness discourse. Thus, while criticizing the era starting with the Coup, the 
following films depict a world beyond reach, but unsheltered from all the upcoming 
effects, where people have warm and intimate relations even conflicts have an 
innocent quality. But what do films offer about Kurdishness in a transformed 
Turkey? 
During his promotion for Vizontele, when interviewed by Hürriyet journal, 
director/writer Yılmaz Erdoğan was reminded that his favorite film was Züğürt Ağa, 
despite having scenes of Kurds literally attack food, and was asked if he would be 
successful to break the tendency of using Eastern people as a part of humor based on 
rudeness. He replies that in society there is a tendency to think Kurds as a 
community with stereotypes and that he turned down a role in Kurdish story written 
by a scenarist never had been to the East. He underlines the importance of regional 
experience to be truthful and adds: “How can you write without going? When you 
are never been there, you write clichés depending on what remains in your mind. 
This doesn’t bother the audience, only bother Kurds” (http://hurarsiv. hurriyet.com. 
tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=-222837). Now we will see to what extend Yılmaz 
Erdoğan succeeded in truthfulness regarding the region and how he interpreted 
Kurdishness relying on firsthand experience.  
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5.4.1. Vizontele/Visiontele (2001) 
Written, acted and directed by Yılmaz Erdoğan, mainstream director of new Turkish 
cinema, the film is about the introduction of television to lives of townspeople who 
name television with a pun as vision-tele. Television is the symbol of negative 
developments of the consequent period which ruins “social harmony, innocence and 
purity” (Suner, 2002: 62) of the 70s. While depicting an imaginary past of happiness 
and joy, the town of the film also “appears as a site of restriction, backwardness, and 
destitution” (ibid: 65). In this sense the film shares the same feeling of remoteness 
with Yeşilçam comedies where characters remained naïve under the sheltering roof 
of the remote town.   
The story is based on Erdoğan’s childhood memories set in Gevaş, Van, an Eastern 
town in 1974 summer, and it revolves around Mayor Nazmi (Altan Erkekli) attempts 
to install the TV transmitter which was left, along with a television, by TRT 
(Turkey’s Public Broadcasting Authority) officers. His main help is an eccentric 
former student who is called Deli (Crazy) Emin (Yılmaz Erdoğan). After a number 
of failures, the mission is completed and to celebrate town people gather at Mayor 
Nazmi’s house only to watch that his son is killed during the Peace Operation carried 
out in Cyprus. In the end, the too good to be true small town life is shattered with a 
single integration from the outer world. In this sense, state authority has nothing but 
a devastating effect on once happily living people. Therefore, the intervention of the 
authority/state, sending television to the region and sending troops to Cyrus, caused 
loss of social harmony. Instead of judge, gendarme, guard and urban citizens, this 
time authority reveals itself in the East with above mentioned interventions.  
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Television also stands for the neglector state whose officers left the equipment, 
instead of fixing, to the hands of technology ignorant townspeople. This time 
backwardness or underdevelopment is not put upon a feudal system, since there isn’t 
any, or local people but on state indirectly through television.  
References to Kurdishness in the film are limited to music (but no language), 
costumes, landscape and use of a Kurdish name. Major’s wife, Siti (Demet Akbağ), 
is called after the protagonist of a love story in the most known Kurdish epopee Mem 
u Zin/Mem and Zin written by Ahmet Khani in 1692 (Yücel, 2008: 76-79, emphasis 
is mine). And, visually it is a very colorful film mostly due to the bright, ethnic 
Eastern Anatolian woman costumes decorated with ornaments, and due to lyrical 
landscape shots of Gevaş, a town populated with people of Kurdish origin. However, 
cultural references end here, men hair and costume of the film are in line with the 
fashion of the era. Kurdish identity is not a political or an ideological issue, but a 
decorative element. During an interview film’s creator Erdoğan also stated that he 
chose an apolitical stand: 
 
All characters in the film think in Kurdish and speak in Turkish and the script 
reflects this reality. The film is not about the Kurdish problem, neither does it 
show the Kurds, ignorant, oppressed and pitiful, as it of then is the case in 
Turkish cinema. To illustrate how a real political stand should be, I chose an 
apolitical stand […] I do not consider inserting a Kurdish dialogue as a 
political stand or bravery. I use a Kurdish elegy when the son of the family 
dies during the Cyprus Peace Operation. I narrate a problem, which language 
I use for this purpose is irrelevant (quoted in Dönmez-Colin, 2008: 93) 
 
Indeed, we watch a town of people, assimilated Kurds, the townspeople we see on 
the screen can be from anywhere from Anatolia, not needed to be specifically Kurds. 
Erasing cultural references doesn’t affect consistency or integrity of the story. How 
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this apolitical stand does any good for progressive representations? Haven’t Kurds 
been thinking in Kurdish and speak in Turkish, at least publicly, for long years 
because of oppression which lead to social upheaval and unrest? The film is made in 
relatively peaceful era of Turkey just after the era of violence during the 90s. 
Therefore cultural references which may be acknowledged as separatist or offensive 
to Turks were eliminated to reach mainstream audience. Asuman Suner suggests the 
film “implies that social harmony is only possible at the expense of effacement, or 
disregard, of cultural difference; that small time communities can maintain cordial 
and innocent relations only as long as differences do not come to the surface” (2002: 
70). And, I suggest the film longs for world before of Kurdish identity crisis, political 
and social tension and a time when Kurds only think but cannot speak. Therefore, the 
narratives refrain from provoking statements about the cultural and political issues 
although Yılmaz Erdoğan claims the opposite. His characters may not be ignorant or 
pitiful, but they are naïve and funny peasant with an urban contemporary humor of 
understanding helps to make Kurds ‘less Kurds’.  Some of the dialogues demonstrate 
the sense of humor in the film that is executed by more than 15 characters through 
sketch like side stories such as in the scene between Crazy Emin and Mother Siti talk 
about the use of television: 
Siti: What is it used for? 
Emin: It brings the world to our feet. 
Siti: What for? 
Or in the scene where Mayor announces television’s arrival to the town, people ask 
questions about it: 
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Citizen: What is it used for? 
Mayor: It is a radio with visuals. When you listen to Zeki Müren (a famous Turkish 
singer) you will see him at the same time. 
Fikri: Will he see us too? 
Mayor: I don’t know that either.  
This sarcastic sense of urban humor also seen in a scene between Mayor and his lazy 
unemployed son Nafiz: 
Nafiz: Do you have an order, father? 
Mayor: Yes, but I don’t want to waste on you.  
Or in a scene when Crazy Emin and Mayor have a heart-to-heart talk: 
Emin: In fact, being bastard is a good thing. You don’t have any relative, that’s an 
ace! 
One of the main characters is CHP (Republican People's Party) Mayor Nazmi, a 
retired teacher and a progressive and secular citizen. He represents the ideals of 
modernist Republic at best. And, his citizens are far from ethnic polarization, without 
a distinctive accent they not only talk but look and live like Turks. Apart from a few 
cultural references, the film depicts Kurds without ethnic signs. Only visible cultural 
reference, the bright traditional costumes, is balanced with urban outfits of men, as if 
to say as long as assimilated some cultural elements should be contained. The film 
seems to aim erasing devastating facts of the last two decades and suggest a brand 
new Kurdishness that is avoided politically and approached culturally at minimum to 
be welcomed by the mainstream audience. It is a film about Kurds that doesn’t 
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bother audience, but offended Kurds because of its “naïve Kurdish peasants, which 
contributes to the antics and buffoonery” (Dönmez-Colin, 2008: 93).  
 
5.4.2. Vizontele Tuuba/Visiontele Tuuba (2004) 
In 2003, during an interview at Boğaziçi University, Yılmaz Erdoğan had declared 
his wish to film the sequel which would touch upon the Kurdish issue with his 
weapons and tools, from a humorous perspective and which would refer to social 
chaos of the time as well. (http: //www.milliyet.com.tr/vizontele---de-kurt-sorunu-
var/magazin/magazindetay/11.05.2003/958584/default.htm)   
Based loosely on librarian Güner Senikli’s seven years in Hakkari and director 
Yılmaz Erdoğan’s childhood, set in 1980 summer just before the coup d’état 
September 12, the sequel is about establishing a library during the days of social 
upheaval. Accompanied with his physically handicapped daughter and wife, a leftist 
librarian Güner Senikli (Tarık Akan) is exiled to Gevaş which doesn’t have library. 
Upon his arrival Mayor Nazmi (Altan Erkekli) and Crazy Emin (Yılmaz Erdoğan) 
give hand to him to establish one. Once it is completed, it also serves as a community 
center whose activities ended with the Coup which considers library to be extremely 
leftist, even anarchist and communist. At the end, many of the young men of the 
town are arrested, including the librarian, where the narrator informs us many had 
not returned. With multiple love stories and new characters, the film’s visual and 
thematic elements are in line with its precessor; a harmonious life just before a life 
changing event; devastating 1980 Coup which depoliticized the country by the cruel 
laws of military government.  
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Like the previous film, it doesn’t have a strong dramatic structure but sketch like 
story telling involving library establishment, summer holiday of youngsters, romantic 
relations, Mayor’s estranged religious son who was an alcoholic in the previous film, 
political conflict of Mayor’s left wing political party CHP and right wing AP (Justice 
Party) and increasing social upheaval of the 70s which is presented through leftist 
and rightist groups of the town where hostility among the groups is naïve and 
innocent until the intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces. The struggle among the 
groups and their naïve approach to the matter is one of the main humor sources in the 
film. In one scene leftist Nafiz, son of Mayor, and his comrade Mahmut talk about 
the change rightists made to their slogan on the mountain: 
Nafiz: They changed our slogan! 
Mahmut: Who? 
Nafiz: Social fascists! 
Or in a scene when a young boy tries to tell Mahmut’s girlfriend Hacer that he is 
having a fight with rightists: 
Boy: Today there was a fight with social fascists at the mall. 
Hacer: With whom? 
Boy: Social fascists!  
Hacer: With whom? I don’t understand!. 
Boy: See, with Brother Cahit and his entourage. 
When Mahmut is questioned by his girlfriend Hacer’s father Hadji Zübeyir about his 
university degrees, the same humorous pattern is seen: 
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Zübeyir: How is school going? 
Mahmut: Fine, I left a few lessons. 
Zübeyir: Where did you leave them? 
Mahmut: Mmm, at school. 
The state/authority is criticized on two levels: First its careless and unconcerned 
approach to the Region’s needs through exiled librarian to a place without library. It 
symbolizes the failure of the modernist approach regarding bringing light to the East 
where is now associated with exile, not a place to be enlightened. And secondly, 
authority physically presents itself in devastating and unnerving army intervention 
which is criticized through the vandalized library and arrested innocent people. 
Every progressive step has been taken by the townspeople is vanished with a single 
authoritarian touch. The system criticism doesn’t end here, neglectful facts are 
underlined such as the constant absence of district governor due to trivia reasons and 
the lack of a doctor since no one has been assigned ever.  
A sub-plot revolves around a romantic affair between Crazy Emin and librarian’s 
beautiful daughter Tuba (Tuba Ünsal), the film calls itself after her name with a pun. 
The possibility of inter-ethnical relation is underlined with this affair which would be 
successful if she wasn’t a handicapped, but a very cheerful and optimist Turkish girl. 
Her disability doesn’t have a direct effect on the plot but an insignificant detail used 
as an excuse for the kind of relationship. Furthermore, as in the first film, excluding 
Kurdishness from the plot doesn’t affect the dramatic structure. Although 
“geographical, historical and cultural features are underlined to gain an identity for 
the provincial town” (Suner, 2006: 58), Kurdishness is still degraded to a decorative 
element in the narrative. Kurds are not awfully caricaturized, but they are blended 
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with urban Turkish manners of the 2000s which leaves no room for Kurdish culture. 
The only progressive contribution of the films is putting some of the blame of 
backwardness and underdevelopment on the state.  
Both films are not political, but good comedies which succeeded entertaining masses. 
However, before and the release of the films Yılmaz Erdoğan insisted that the films 
about Kurds would be righteous to the region and the people. He underlined the 
importance of regional experience to make adequate representations. If he hadn’t 
insist on a different Kurdish discourse and declared that his films would touch upon 
Kurdish issue, then the lack of Kurdish culture and any other ethnic references 
wouldn’t come to attention; the films would be accepted as they are: mass 
entertainment. However, they lack a serious criticism to the system. Same as the first 
film, the only cultural reference is colorful traditional women costumes. If the films 
would follow the rout of the political, social and cultural changes then they would 
contain characters not only thinking in Kurdish but make them speak even a few 
words, use Kurdish names other than Siti, would demonstrate a Kurdish dish or a 
handwriting. All of these are not necessary if a plain comedy is aimed but the 
director’s constant declarations on ethnic narrative requires these elements. At the 
end, these characters are as believable as the first group films’ characters when 
ethnic elements are considered.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Media generally, Yeşilçam particularly, transmit highly selective images framed by 
certain ideologies on many issues that are outside the personal knowledge and 
experience of the cinema goers. My first experience with Kurds and as well as other 
minorities that I know of was through the Yeşilçam films. For long years I didn’t 
meet a minority in real life or I have not realized if I had seen one since they were 
assimilated or in the closet. And to be honest my sheer knowledge of Kurds 
depended on the people passed by Turkish actors to be mocked in the first set of 
films which were unbelievably vulgar and simple films with loose plots and not the 
best quality production, but you watch nonetheless because they were making you 
laugh in repetitive narratives at “some people” who are somehow different. And I got 
interested in the feeling of being a minority wondered how Kurds had reacted to 
these films. Did assimilated urban Kurds distance themselves from the images and 
think they are not one of them? How rural Kurds feel about the images product of an 
understanding of the majority of the society? Were they enjoying or only bothered as 
Yılmaz Erdoğan suggests?  
113 
 
Contrary to Erdoğan, I think even for Turkish audience the films are annoying, but at 
the same time funny. The annoyance is acting on different levels: the vulgar 
language and manners that are too different from urban comedies where Kurds 
degraded to a bunch of stereotypes vulgar and uncivilized. Moreover you laugh at 
Kurds openly, even if they are not called so. But these are some of the risks you take 
when you are watching an ethnic comedy, a genre I discussed in this study which 
served as a fruitful terrain for examining Kurdishness discourse in Turkish cinema.  
Throughout the study I have dealt with discourses concerning identities in cinema. 
While doing so, I aimed to understand the structure behind minority representations 
through a journey from early Yeşilçam to contemporary films. To this end, as an 
identity building strategy to survive in the beginning, and then a preference, passing 
was discussed within sociological and cinematic frameworks. For the sake of the 
argument, passing in cinema, particularly comedies, is examined as a tool of the 
dominant discourse to maintain its power. Same as nationalistic discourse, this kind 
of passing strategy assumes a core identity which should either be polished as in 
Turkishness, or exaggerated or disregarded as in representing minorities. When the 
study unfolds I saw that through the given period of time, passing was used as a 
strategy to support and verify Turkishness through various minority stereotypes from 
dramas to comedies. Un-Turkish and unwelcomed manners were attributed to the 
minorities who were passed by Turkish actors and actresses.  
Turkey has faced significant political, social and cultural changes due to neo-liberal 
policies starting from the 1980s which led to rise of the new right and its neo-liberal 
economic policies where the mission of cultural enhancement was left for the sake of 
cultural popularism. In this realm of individualism and competition, Turkish society 
met consumer and mass culture, and consequently faced a wide cultural 
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transformation namely: shatter in political, economical and cultural ideologies, rising 
terror activities, and born of “so called” democratic, libertarian and liberal, only in 
sense of free market, ideology that calls itself democratic-Islam. Above of all, under 
the disguise, this liberal ideology is deprived of basic human rights, lack of respect to 
not only ethnic but also religious and gender minorities. The lack of acceptance and 
understanding in the society towards minorities reveal itself through mainstream 
cinema where Kurdishness has nearly invisible a ghost-like presence. In the 
contemporary films, even if Kurdishness is reminded through cultural elements, it is 
never outspoken, it is almost invisible. We presume they are Kurds due to these 
details and accept their cultural differences through them. This superficial acceptance 
of another culture is not progressive in the sense of understanding the conflicts of the 
society.  
The study reveals that any representation is still under very tight leash not only 
because of the will to sustain unearned and lasting privilege, and moreover because 
of their rooted place in social and cultural life due to very long years of media 
mediation. We can understand the long living effects of the negative representations 
and media mediation through Halbwachs who underscored that in modern societies, 
even though individuals are seemed to be left to their own devices, their lives are 
constantly penetrated and insinuated by the society due to the multiple and complex 
nature of the relations. And the mind reconstructs its memories under the pressure of 
this very complicated society (1992: 50-51). As a living structure, ambivalent and 
changing, collective memory through representations grasps subjects not from minds 
but from hearts as rude and underdeveloped comic Kurdish stereotypes that Yılmaz 
Erdoğan challenges while offering nothing progressive but ambiguous.  
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In Erdoğan’s films, we don’t see Kurds as laughable under civilized people but 
people like Turks; ordinary law abiding small town people who have no intention for 
social upheaval. They are not stereotypes but interesting and educated characters 
who are not the subject but creator of humor with clever dialogues. With this kind of 
positive labeling, Kurds are passed like Turks only having small cultural differences. 
Sole cultural reference left in the memories is women costume worn by Kurds with 
urban Turkish manners. I suggest that blending Kurds with Turkish labels is not a 
very different strategy than blending Kurds with excessive labeling. It seems the 
mainstream audience’s acceptance works on two levels: laughing at “more Kurds” 
and laughing together with “less Kurds”. Mainstream comedy films pass Kurdishness 
either as the opposite of Turkishness with a privileged and hegemonic point of view 
by orientalizing the ethnic people by depicting them as uncivilized, childish, 
ignorant, lazy, and lack of Turkish urban manners, or depicting them with proper 
Turkish manners. 
Kurdishness discourse may have changed, but the dominant ideology towards 
minorities remained almost the same. From ridiculing Kurdishness to docile 
representations, the change isn’t as progressive as it should be considering the social 
changes Turkey faced. Clearly, this cinematic discourse is in close relation with 
society’s approach towards minorities and understanding of them. In the absence of 
acceptance and tolerance towards the others, cinematic discourse can only evolve 
with minor steps. After discussing the ethnic semiosis in the films it can be suggested 
that Vizontele films has a few saying on Kurdish culture, instead they utter: We have 
a colorful life not much different from yours, and these words are outspoken by 
Kurdish origin director.  
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Passing Kurdishness in mainstream cinema hasn’t progressed much from overly 
exaggerated stereotypes to less-Kurds. We have moved from the images where 
ethnic differences were naturalized and normalized through neglect of social 
disadvantages to invisibility. Although passing strategy has seemed to change, the 
aim is still the same; mainstream cinema passes Kurds as “more Kurds” or less 
Kurds”, in a strategy which aims to maintain dominance of Turkishness over the 
others of the society implicitly or explicitly in line with the subconscious of the 
society or the collective thinking of the majority.  
Passing would be a fruitful notion in understanding the conceptualizing not only 
ethnic but also sexual identities. A further study would undertake the analysis of 
LGBT individuals through the discourses of femininity and masculinity in Turkish 
society. The study would approach to both passing and gender from a post-modern 
point of view as performance. Therefore, passing gender, particularly LGBT 
individuals in cinema can be examined to understand the collective thinking of the 
majority about gendered identities through culturally shaped discursive practices.  
Last but not least, Ana Lopez notes that “understanding the nation demands a look 
that can see its narrations, ambivalence and hybridity; that can see the international 
within the national” (1993: 151) and I suggest through the discussed films we can 
only experience the national through one sided narration of the majority where things 
about minorities are not told as they really are, but from a distorted angle. 
Consequently mainstream cinema holds a dominance that involves of reproduction of 
certain strategies, including passing which is a matter of taking appearance for 
reality, to legitimize social inequality where privileged holds power over the 
marginalized.  
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